Introduction
Ambiguity continues to mark the debate as to whether there is a Latino politics in the United States that is both identifiable and separable from the politics of other groups or that of the nation as a whole (de la Garza & Desipio, 1992; de la Garza, et. al, 1992; Garcia, 1988; Hero, 1992; Vigil, 1987; Villarreal, Hernandez, & Neighbor, 1988;). However, for analysts of Latino politics, the 1992 elections provide the clearest and most revealing indicators to date in illuminating political patterns evident within at least some segments of the Latino population.
For Hispanics in Florida, especially Cuban-Americans, the 1992 elections brought continued expansion of their conservative political base and enhanced political incorporation at the local, state, and even federal levels. Locally, in metropolitan Miami-Dade County, Latins have consolidated their status as the core electoral constituency. Hispanics have also strengthened their local political position due to the recent federal court ruling which overturned the county's at-large election system on the basis that it prevented Hispanics and blacks from electing their "preferred candidates."
In state politics, Cuban Republican legislators from Dade County have emerged as an important swing vote on matters ranging from the selection of state legislative leaders to the enactment or defeat of major policies. On the issue of reapportionment, Cuban Republicans were nothing short of catalytic in dramatically modifying the Democratic majority's plans for Congressional and state legislative district lines. In statewide elections, south Florida's Latin voters again demonstrated that in close statewide contests, their bloc voting can alter the outcome.
Nationally, the election of three Cuban-Americans to the U.S. House (two from South Florida and one from New Jersey), combined with the ongoing lobbying efforts of such groups as the Cuban American National Foundation, has resulted in an expanded role in Washington, at least with regard to shaping policy toward Cuba. More generally, Cuban-Americans have emerged as a group whose support is actively courted by a growing number of officeholders from outside the state -- from presidential candidates down to members of Congress seeking campaign contributions.
However, Cuban-American electoral victories in 1992 and the vigorous promotion of a broader political agenda that encompassed issues as diverse as trade with Cuba and legislative reapportionment, have not been the only gauges of political accomplishment. There are also some indications of a broadening of the partisan and ideological boundaries of the Cuban community, marked by an increase in the overtures made by political actors who previously would have had little expectation of attracting significant support from either Cuban elites or rank and file voters. The Clinton campaign's effort to court Cuban support in Florida was only the most visible manifestation of such activity.
Collectively, such developments have resulted in the emergence of a group that has increasingly found its niche in American politics, is still in the process of securing its base, and now has regular access to the corridors of power at all three of levels of government.
A Demographic Sketch
Based on 1990 census, Florida's Hispanic population has continued to grow, both in actual and proportional terms -- increasing from approximately 860,000 people, or 8.9 percent of the total population in 1980, to 1,574,000 people, or 12.1 percent of the total population in 1990. In real terms, the population grew by over 83 percent. Given the pace of growth, it seems likely that by the 2000 census, Hispanic will have overtaken blacks (who presently constitute 14 percent of the population) as the state's largest minority group.
Hispanic population growth outside of Dade County was also notable, but not yet of political significance. Osceola County in central Florida (near Orlando) experienced in the 1980s the largest increase of its Hispanic population (in proportional terms) than any other county in the nation. The mostly Puerto Rican Hispanic residents of Osceola, following the lead of Cubans in Dade, have attempted to organized politically around the formally moribund Republican party. Moreover, Latins now makeup from 7 to 12 percent of the populations in the metropolitan areas of Ft. Lauderdale, Palm Beach, Tampa, and Orlando. However, Dade county remains with approximately 1,000,000 Hispanics representing over 63 percent of the state's Latin population the hub of Latin political and economic affairs in Florida. Thus, with Florida's Latin voting population being overwhelmingly Cuban and geographically clustered in the metropolitan Miami-Dade County area, one is best able to analyze the impact of the 1992 Latin vote in the state through the examination of predominantly Latin precincts (at least 60 percent Latin population) within Dade County.
However, while Cuban's constitute a clear majority of Florida's, and specifically Dade County's, Hispanic population, recent demographic patterns suggest the need to continue too closely observe how the growing national, economic, cultural, and political diversity of Florida's Latin community might effect what frequently has been viewed as a politically monolithic enclave -- a perception that generally bolsters the position of Cuban political leaders who claim to speak for a united constituency. A case in point is the fact that although Florida's Cuban population has continued to mushroom, the number of Hispanics from other countries has grown even faster. It is estimated that over 300,000 Latin Americans moved into Dade County during the last decade. Ten years ago, slightly more than 70 percent of the Hispanics in Dade were of Cuban descent. The 1990 census shows that the proportion has dropped to just under 60 percent. However, until the rate of citizenship and active assertion of an alternative political agenda are evident, one cannot expect the non-Cuban Latin population to have a discernable impact on political outcomes.
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)
Patterns of Persistence and Change Among Cuban Voters
While Hispanics now constitute a majority of the population of Dade County, making it the largest county with a Hispanic majority in the nation, by official county figures, they constitute just 29.6% of the area's registered voters. However, while some significant portion of the discrepancy between population and registered voter figures is obviously related to non-citizenship, it is also important to realize that the county's estimate Hispanic voters counts only those who are foreign born. This method of identifying Hispanics stands in contrast to the self-identification method used in the census and by all levels of governments in the creation of districts that have Hispanic majorities through the reapportionment process. Based on the analysis of Dade county birth and death rates among Hispanics since 1960 (Metro-Dade Planning Department, 1986) one may conclude that official county figures underestimate the number of Hispanic registrants by 10 to 15 percent (18,000-27,000 registrants).(1)
Cubans and the Presidential Election
Notwithstanding indications of growing political diversity and complexity within the ranks of Miami's Cuban voters, the 1992 elections once again underscored the phenomenon of strong Cuban loyalty to the Republican party (Moreno & Rae, 1992; Moreno & Warren, 1992; Warren, Corbett, & Stack, 1990,). Repeating a pattern especially evident in presidential elections since the Reagan victory of 1980, George Bush carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade County with approximately 70 percent of the vote, far surpassing his proportion of the vote either nationally or statewide (see table 1).
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
Anticipating strong support, Cuban-Americans were a particularly important element in the re-election strategy of George Bush. Texas and Florida were considered the two states most vital to a Bush re-election and were at one time considered "safe" states for the Bush ticket. Jeb Bush, chair of the Bush-Quayle Campaign in Florida and the President's son, expressed the importance of Florida in the GOP's electoral college strategy, "We can't win without winning Florida unless some new math gets invented between now and then (election day)" (Merzer, 1992). However, as polls showed Clinton gaining ground in Florida, heavy Cuban support for the GOP was considered increasingly essential for victory in the state.
On election day, Bush's margin of victory in Florida was less than 86,000 votes, a dramatic reduction of his almost one million vote margin in 1988. Clearly, the Dade County Hispanic voters who cast 70 percent of their votes for Bush provided a critical edge in the state. Had Clinton and Perot, either individually or together, seriously split the Cuban vote, the state likely would have gone Democratic for the first time since 1976.
The importance as well as the distinctiveness of the Cuban-American vote for Bush was illustrated by the fact that he lost to Clinton county-wide, faring poorly among Dade's two other major ethnic groups. Non-Hispanic whites in Dade gave Clinton approximately 55 percent of their vote, while black precincts supported the Democratic candidate with upwards to 85 percent of the vote (see table 1).
Although, as discussed below, Clinton made the first concerted effort ever by a Democratic presidential candidate to court the Cuban vote, he still received only about 22 percent of the vote in Hispanic precincts. Yet, this weak showing must be measured against the fact that the Democratic candidates in the 1984 and 1988 elections had only 12 and 15 percent of the Hispanic vote respectively. Moreover, Clinton, despite being in a three-man race, often ran ahead of local Democratic candidates in the Latin precincts, reflecting the weakness of the local Democratic party among Cuban-American voters. Perot, who made virtually no direct appeal to Cuban voters in 1992, received less than 6 percent of the vote in the same Latin precincts, although he received 20 percent of the state-wide vote (see tables 1 and 2).
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)
Even in the face of such bloc voting, it is important to note the subtler changes that mark contemporary Cuban-American politics in Florida. The 1992 elections saw a broadening of the political space in Miami's Cuban American community, and the challenging of at least some previous stereotypes regarding the political and ideological uniformity of Cuban voters. Indeed, as the campaign continued, and Bush's standing in polls fell, what was remarkable was that a point was reached at which overwhelming Cuban support for Bush could no longer be taken for granted.
Especially, if one examines the Reagan era and his enormous popularity, it is easy to see that Miami's Cuban-Americans have been among the most loyal voters for recent GOP Presidential candidates. Florida has been a state of consistent Republican support in recent presidential elections, with the Republican nominee wining in nine of the last 11 presidential elections (losing only in 1964 and 1976). But even in that context, Hispanic voters supported the Republican nominee for president in 1980, 1984, and 1988 by extraordinary margins, ranging from four to one, to seven to one (See table 2).
By 1992, however, there were signs of Cuban disaffection with the Bush presidency. Similar to other regions in which Bush had lost his political capital, south Florida was especially hard hit by the 1991-92 economic downturn. Two airlines with large operations in Miami, Eastern and Pan American, went into bankruptcy, costing the city thousands of high-paying jobs. Unemployment in Dade county was above the national average for the first time in many years.
Bush more directly displeased his anti-Communist Cuban supporters by not enthusiastically backing a tougher policy toward Castro. The administration was slow to support the Cuban Democracy Act (popularly known as the Torricelli bill, after its Democratic sponsor from New Jersey) which angered the powerful Cuban-American National Foundation and its chairman Jorge Mas Canosa. The legislation tightened the decade old U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, while at the same time increasing phone and mail contacts. The Bush administration, at first opposed key provisions of the bill that would deny U.S. aid to countries providing assistance to Cuba and bar U.S. subsidiaries abroad from trading with Cuba. Bush did not endorse the bill until mid-1992, well after Clinton had indicated his support for the proposed law while making a campaign swing through Little Havana in April.
Many Cuban-Americans were also angered by revelations that the U.S. State Department was cooperating with Cuba to curb exile attacks on the island. Three ranking State Department officials, told the Miami Herald, that the U.S. was informing the Castro government of planned exile attacks against Cuba. Two of the unidentified officials said there had been cooperation with Cuba on three occasions during a six month period. The official claimed that, "anything that we knew about that would violate U.S. law we would have made known. We would inform the Cubans beforehand" (Whitefield, 1992).
This policy was widely condemned in the Cuban community. The administration responded by having its top Latin American officials claim that staff members had overstated the degree to which the United States was cooperating with Cuba. Bernard Aronson, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, told the Miami Herald that, "Our policy is to enforce the laws of the United States, including the neutrality law, but there's no ongoing policy of cooperating or collaborating with the Castro regime. There have been isolated incidents in the past when -- it was necessary to exchange information. But there is no ongoing or regular process of cooperating with Cuba as implied by an unnamed State Department official" (Whitefield, 1992). Acting in both his political and familial capacities, Jeb Bush went on Miami's Spanish language radio to defend his father on the issue, disputing the idea that the administration had been systematically involved in tipping Cuba off with regard to possible exile attacks.
The net impact of these incidents, combined with Bush's general downward slide in the polls in Florida, left the Clinton-Gore campaign with a political entree in Florida, and again, Cuban-American played an important role in campaign strategy. Clinton was the first Democratic presidential nominee to actively court the Cuban community. Indeed, in many respects, the Clinton campaign went far beyond previous state and local Democratic party efforts to make any inroads with Cuban constituents. In making several visits to Florida, Clinton attempted to assure Cuban-Americans voters that he would maintain a hard-line policy toward the Castro regime. His early endorsement of the Torricelli bill became only the most visible Clinton overture.
The political role and significance of Florida's Hispanic community was amplified in the 1992 presidential election given that Florida was now viewed as a competitive state for the first time since 1976. In 1984, Democratic candidate Walter Mondale made but one visit to Florida after his nomination, and that was to a safely Democratic condominium community in a predominately Jewish section of North Miami. Dukakis made even less of an effort in the state, effectively conceding Florida to Bush by mid-September in the 1988 election. The Massachusetts governor withdrew all but a handful of campaign workers and lost the state by almost one million votes. However, the combination of Clinton and Gore's southern base, and their relatively secure status in most of their "must win" states, meant that there was a rare opportunity for a serious campaign and a possible Democratic victory in Florida.
The focus on Cuban-Americans was but one important "angle" pursued by the Clinton-Gore campaign in Florida, albeit one that had many secondary objectives. The overall Clinton strategy for the state was to keep Bush pinned down trying to protect his own base. One pundit described it as, "the political equivalent of a full-court press, of in your face campaigning, of going right after the other guy's strength" (Fiedler, 1992). The overall strategy was then accentuated by focusing on important in-state constituencies. In north Florida Clinton cited his "son of the south" roots, telling voters that the region felt like south Arkansas. Among Florida's Jewish voters he criticized the Bush administration for its reluctance to back a $10 billion loan guarantee that would provide Israel with assistance in dealing with its refugee problems. However, the campaign's focus on the Cuban community was particularly intricate, and even given the lopsided vote against him, can be considered a successful strategy from the standpoint of other objectives.
While, not even the most optimistic Democrat believed that Clinton could win a majority of Cuban-American voters, the strategy was aimed at cutting into the huge GOP margins of the last three elections. The Democrats believed they could win Florida if they could reduce Cuban support for the GOP to two-to-one, a margin which would translate approximately into two to three additional percentage points for the Democratic ticket in the state wide vote. State party leader Simon Ferro, himself a Cuban-American, said Clinton, "is the candidate we have been waiting 20 years for. I think for once we're going to make a dent in this vote" (Fiedler, 1992).
As the first highly publicized overture by a Democratic presidential candidate toward the Cuban community, Clinton's campaign promised to lay the groundwork for reversing some of the bitterness that still lingers from Kennedy's withdrawal of support for exiles who attempted to retake Cuba at the Bay of Pigs some 30 years ago, as well as the Carter administrations' controversial dialogue with the Castro regime in 1977. Clinton based his Miami strategy on addressing Cubans' fears that a Democratic administration would revisit U.S.-Cuban policy and lift the economic embargo against the Castro regime. Moreover, Bush's hesitancy in embracing the Democratic Torricelli bill combined with 12 years of unfulfilled Republican presidential rhetoric on the need to hasten Castro's demise, actually seemed to at least temporarily place Clinton to Bush's right on the issue of Cuba. That Bush ceremoniously came to Miami to sign the Torricelli bill into law, inviting neither the bill's author nor its Senate sponsor, Florida Democrat Bob Graham, was widely viewed as petty partisanship -- even during an election year. Few credited Bush's eventual support as having anything to do with the bill's passage.
Soon after his endorsement of Torricelli's legislation, Clinton raised $275,000 in one night at two Miami fundraisers attended predominantly by Cuban-Americans. Follow-up visits by both Hillary Clinton (whose sister-in-law Maria Victoria Arias is a Cuban Republican living in Miami, who mobilized fellow Cuban-Americans for the Clinton campaign) and Tipper Gore were also considered successes.
While formally endorsing Bush, Jorge Mas Canosa, head of the influential Cuban American National Foundation had numerous contacts with Clinton and attended the Little Havana fundraiser, suggesting a strong pragmatism even within an organizations often inaccurately depicted as singularly tied to the Republicans. The Free Cuba Political Action Committee, which is the foundation's vehicle for campaign contributions, contributed twice as much to Democratic candidates for office nationwide than Republicans during the 1990-92 election cycle. Mas Canosa himself stated, "Although I'm voting for Bush out of loyalty, Clinton's decisive support of the Cuban Democracy Act turned the Cuban-American community around" (Falk, 1992).
The Democratic strategy appeared to pay off. The Hamilton Poll taken in August showed that while the Arkansan still trailed Bush 72-23 percent among Cuban voters, Clinton was doing twice as well as Dukakis had. An October Mason Dixon\ Media Research poll showed a 55-36 percentage split between Bush and Clinton respectively. Mas Canosa, no doubt seeing the even more important national poll figures, issued a near-endorsement of Clinton, stating that, "any fears that the Cuban-American community may have of the Clinton administration with regard to Castro's Cuba have dissipated" (Merzer, 1992).
However, election day saw Cuban-Americans return to the Republican fold in numbers greater than some of the polls had predicted. Although, George Bush did not match his 1988 showing among Cuban-Americans he was still able to carry the Hispanic precincts by approximately a seven-to-three margin. Cuban-American voters were an important factor in Bush's Florida victory in a contest that proved to be closer than anyone genuinely expected.
While the Clinton campaign's hoped for cut into Bush's margin of victory among Cuban voters fell short of the two-to-one target, the inroads with the Cuban elite were unprecedented. Beyond opening lines of communication with CANF, in early September, 13 Cuban-Americans members of Dade County's 120 member Republican Executive Committee endorsed Clinton, expressing their belief that the Democrat would do more than Bush had to rid Cuba of Castro.
Thus, while the Cuban vote can prove to be the decisive element in an otherwise close state election (as it was in the election of Senator Connie Mack in 1988 and as it seems to have been in the 1992 presidential contest), the community's impact transcends the number of votes cast for any one candidate. Latins in Florida constitute 7 percent of the nation's Hispanic voters, (NALEO, 1992, p. 2) but the state's Cuban community is responsible for 15 percent of all Hispanic campaign contributions nationwide. Influence within the Spanish Language media is also proportionately greater than population alone would indicate (Falk, 1992).
That the Hispanic voters of Dade county figured heavily in the Florida strategy of both presidential candidates speaks to the enhanced political role of the community. Perhaps most importantly, the community's clout has shown itself to be significant not only when actively asserted at the polls or through lobbying and campaign support, but is increasingly a status that is voluntarily recognized and actively courted. Such voluntary recognition reduces the future costs of exercising influence over the political process.
Federal Races
In the U.S. senate race, Cuban-Americans overwhelmingly supported moderate, incumbent Democrat Bob Graham over Billy Grant a former north Florida Congressman who had little state or national party backing, and who ran an underfunded skeleton campaign. Graham's showing in the predominantly Hispanic precincts frequently approached Bush's 70 percent margin. Even measured against a weak opponent, the vote constituted a remarkable turnaround in Graham's fortunes among Cuban voters. Although he had received a much smaller majority of the votes in Hispanic precincts in his 1982 gubernatorial reelection (again, against comparatively weak opposition), in his 1986 Senate election against Republican incumbent Paula Hawkins, he only received 24 percent of the vote (Moreno & Warren, 1992, p. 134). While Graham's sponsorship of the Cuban Democracy Act was praised among the Cuban leadership, in general it was only an extension of what has been his politically low-keyed, service orientation toward his Hispanic constituents - - a political strategy that seems to have turned very uneven support in the past into a more solid and predictable base, at least when not opposed by a more prominent Republican candidate.
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
The fact that Democrats were able to maintain a foothold with Cuban voters in the U.S. Senate by no means counterbalances the more dramatic overall setback suffered by the Democratic party establishment in Dade County's delegation to the U.S. House. Always dominated by non-Hispanic Democrats, as of the late 1980's Dade County's four-member congressional delegation had over 100 years of U.S. House and Senate experience among them, with the seniority, clout, and committee assignments such longevity represents. However, as a result of the remarkable turnover of south Florida congressional seats in 1992 election, Cuban Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who won Claude Pepper's seat when he died in 1989, is now the senior U.S. representative from Dade County, all of the others being newly elected. Of the three members who have at least some substantial share of their district in Dade County, one is Hispanic and another is black. The previous incumbents in these three seats (Dante Fascell, William Lehman, and Larry Smith) decided not to run for varying reasons, but reapportionment and the inevitable creation of more Hispanic-Republican and black Democratic majority districts was at least a factor in two instances.
The election of the second Cuban-American to Dade's congressional delegation was accomplished by Dade's Hispanic voters with little controversy or fanfare. In sharp contrast to the ethnically polarized election of Ros-Lehtinen in 1989, Lincoln Diaz-Balart faced no opposition from Dade's non-Hispanic white community. Although the former state senator did have Republican primary opposition from a state senate colleague who is also Cuban, he had no Democratic challenger in the general election -- a rather startling state of affairs in a county that had not sent Republican to Congress prior to 1989.
Another race worthy of note for its symbolic indication of a new, broader dialogue within Florida's Cuban community was the challenge liberal Cuban-American Democrat, Madga Davis, mounted against incumbent Ros-Lehtinen. Arguing for a more progressive U.S. policy toward the Cuban government and a liberal domestic agenda, Davis' candidacy argued against the perception of a monolithic Cuban-American political bloc. While the reelection of Ros-Lehtinen was at no time in doubt, the Davis candidacy, along with the creation of organizations such as the mostly Democratic Cuban Council for Democracy, illustrates the phenomenon in Florida of Cubans running against Cubans, at time across partisan, generational, and even ideological lines. In the end, however, Davis' candidacy may have contributed in a marginal way to Clinton's poor showing in the Hispanic community. Her position on dialogue with Cuba and loosening of the embargo gave credence to those in the community who have generally distrusted the foreign policy of the Democratic party. Davis' positions proved extremely unpopular in the Cuban precincts were she lost to Ros-Lehtinen by a margin of over four-to-one. In the non-Latin White precincts, Davis ran much better obtaining over 47 percent of the vote.
Reapportionment and the State Legislature
Although the emphasis of the preceding analysis has been on the indicators of a broadening of the political dialogue within Florida's largely Cuban Hispanic community, one need only examine the state ongoing fight over reapportionment of U.S. house and state legislative seats to see what an effective political base the Republican party has become, as well as how political cohesion remains the norm among both Hispanic political leaders and rank and file voters.
As has been the case in several states, reapportionment has served as a primary catalyst in the creation of more Hispanic seats in both Congress and state legislatures. The 1992 process was the first to feel the full impact of the 1982 amendments to Federal Voting Rights Act and recent federal court rulings which require creation of minority district where possible -- essentially mandating "affirmative gerrymandering" (Dixon, 1981; Derfner, 1981; Wells, 1981). In Dade county especially, incumbent white Democrats confronted the "double whammy" of a shrinking delegation and the federal legal requirements for the creation of minority districts. Previously, lawmakers could secure certain "safe" seats as a top priority, so long as some minority seats were established. Minorities were given more seats than they had, and were generally expected to be satisfied.
In 1992, however, Cuban Republicans were particularly assertive, and by any measure successful, in influencing the state's reapportionment. As significant as the winning of two seats out of four in the U.S. Congress was, it was the pressure exerted by Cuban Republicans in the state legislature, in the redrawing of district lines, that made it possible, while at the same time securing more Hispanic majority seats in that body. Having been instrumental in the reapportionment battles in both the state legislature and the courts, Hispanic state legislature saw two additional Cuban Republicans elected to Dade's delegation to the State House, while retaining three seats in the State Senate. As a result, Cuban-Republicans now hold 12 out of the 25 legislative seats (48 percent) that lie primarily in Dade, as opposed to the 8 out of 28 state seats (29 percent) and zero out of 4 congressional seats as recently as 1986. Pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in De Grandy vs Wetherell, the suit challenging state house district lines, there could yet be a redrawing of those lines, a special election, and a potential gain of three additional seats in the state delegation. There are now no non-Cuban Republicans in the Dade delegation to either Washington or Tallahassee, reflecting the extent to which the Republican party has been an effective vehicle for Cuban office
seekers from south Florida.
Democratic attempts to appeal to Cuban-American voters has been plagued by the inability or unwillingness of the state and local party organizations to recruit attractive Hispanic candidates. In the 1992 contests, only two Hispanic Democrats ran for any of the combined 29 seats in the Congress, State House, and State Senate. Instead, Dade Democrats put-up non-Latin whites to run against Cuban Republicans in districts that were designed to elect Latinos. This created ethnically polarized elections throughout Dade County which may have contributed to the poor showing by the Democratic Presidential candidate.
Indeed, the 1992 election reflected the degree to which the Dade County Republican Party has become little more than a "front organizations" for the interests of the Cuban community (Moreno & Rae, 1992). While not always united on every issue, Cuban-Republicans are now the most politically coherent and potent force in the Dade delegation to the state legislature. A Cuban, Eladio Armesto-Garcia, defeated Bruce Hoffman, the only non-Hispanic Republican in the Dade delegation, in the Republican primary. Moreover, three Cuban Republicans defeated strong Anglo-Democrats opponents on the strength of Latin bloc voting.
The strength of the Latino voting was illustrated in the 34th State Senate District where Cuban-Republicans, Alberto Gutman, faced a strong challenge from a Democrat, Kendall Coffey. Gutman was well funded, but was running on a very weak record as a state representative, and was widely perceived as vulnerable in a district that had a slight Republican majority, but slightly under 50 percent Hispanic registration. However, Gutman defeated Coffey 59 to 41 percent, as he swept many Latin precincts by a four to one margin. Coffey lost despite being endorsed by the Miami Herald and carrying 55 percent of the district's non-Latin white vote. Significantly, Coffey ran well ahead of Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton in the Anglo precincts, (in fact George Bush won the district's non-Latin precincts) but Coffey ran behind Clinton in the Latin areas. Similarly, political newcomer Bruno Barriero narrowly defeated Democrat Steve Leifman in State House District 107 despite the fact that Leifman was endorsed by the Miami Beach political establishment. Leifman won the non-Latin areas 57-43 percent, but lost the Latin areas 77-23 percent.
Cuban Republicans gains have not just been evident within the context of the Dade delegation, however. One could well imagine the Cuban legislators' influence being totally marginalized in the 120 member state house and 40 member State Senate. But statewide Republican gains (presently holding exactly one half of the seats in the senate), combined with bloc voting by Cuban legislators, and a willingness to vote with Democratic and urban coalitions when it serves their interests, have made the Cuban legislators a critical swing vote on many issues. With regard to the phenomenon, one longtime lobbyist was quoted as saying, "What you may find is the beginning of almost a third party. When you combine forces together they will be the swing vote. If you haven't had a relationship with them, you better start" (Branch, 1992).
CONCLaUSIONS
In his analysis of the Latino vote in California's 1988 election, Fernardo Guerra identified six conditions that were necessary for California's Latino voters to play a significant role in a national election (Guerra, 1993, p. 100). His framework offers one gauge for drawing conclusions with regard to the significance of the Hispanic vote in Florida in 1992. Guerra specifies the following factors as particularly significant: unified Latino support for one candidate; a close contest with the state playing a critical role in the outcome; a strategy for registration and mobilization of Latino voters; visible participation in the nomination and subsequent campaign of the candidate; the presence of other Latino candidates in other contests or of ballot issues relevant to the Latino community; and the existence of a party or campaign organization to mobilize Latino voters without in turn alienation other groups in the more general electorate.
The foregoing analysis has shown that in terms of those variables suggested above that most directly involve group cohesion and mobilizations, Cuban-Americans in Florida demonstrated unified support for candidate of choice, were critical, and perhaps decisive to a Bush victory in the state, demonstrated the ability to effectively mobilize fellow Cuban-Americans voters, were broadly involved in a wide array of electoral contests and other issues including reapportionment, and have been successful in the extreme in using the Republican party as a vehicle for lasting political incorporation. While the Florida Hispanic vote for Bush certainly did not alter the outcome of the presidential election, Latins in the state were nonetheless successful in attracting attention from the eventual winner. By virtue of their being actively courted by Clinton, expanding their role in campaign finance, gaining more of a voice in Washington, and further consolidating their leadership posture in state and local politics, Cuban-Americans in Florida have demonstrated the ability to transcend their previous status as a cohesive groups of voters courted by non-Hispanic candidates in elections, and then downgraded afterwards. Cuban-Americans are making inroads in elite politics and are consistently building on their growing electoral clout to project themselves into those institutional processes that not only respond to narrow group interests, but more broadly shape political and policy agendas at all levels of government.
The only factors on the horizons which in any way promise to dilute the enhanced political status of Cuban-Americans are 1) the growing diversity of the state's Hispanic population, and 2) some initial indicators of slightly less cohesion along partisan, policy, and ideological lines. As suggested earlier, in order for the first factor to become politically significant, non-Cuban Hispanics would need to become citizens in much greater numbers than has been the case, would have to register and mobilize around alternative candidates, and would need to be in a position to effectively push for an alternative political agenda. There are virtually no indications at present of any of these things occurring. The second factor, while an interesting development in terms of undermining previously held stereotypes, it also not likely to jeopardize the basic solidarity of Cuban voters and their political leaders on issues that most directly concern the community. Cuban political elites and rank and file voters are demonstrating that they are not entirely "knee-jerk" in their support for the Republican party or in promoting a conservative line on all issues of public policy. Political maturation and enhanced effectiveness and clout are the likely outcomes, at least in the short term, of expanded political dialogue within Florida's Cuban community.
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1. In analyzing 1992 election data, Hispanic precincts have ben chosen on the basis of having at least 60 percent Hispanic registration, with Hispanic registration being defined by the county as including only those who were foreign-born. On this basis, 107 Hispanic precincts were identified out of a total of 516 in Dade county. References to voting patterns among blacks or non-Hispanic whites are based on analysis of precincts with 85 percent black or non-Hispanic white registration.