INTRODUCTION
The 1988 Presidential election saw Cuban-Americans in Florida vote overwhelmingly Republican. George Bush carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade County (Miami) with over 85 percent of the vote, while another conservative Republican, Connie Mack, carried those same precincts in Florida's U.S. Senate race with about 80 percent of the vote1. Cuban-Republicans also made impressive gains in the Dade delegation to the Florida state legislature, picking up two additional seats in the Senate, while retaining their seven seats in Florida's lower house, and being the decisive voting bloc in the election of the only non-Hispanic Republican in the delegation. Republicans presently hold 11 out of 28 seats; 10 are Cuban-Americans. As late as 1980, there was were only one Republican in the Dade delegation, and none were Cuban.
These l988 election results underscore the pattern of strong Cuban loyalty to the GOP -- a pattern which was more latent through the 1970's, but which was then dramatically reinforced in the l980 presidential election when over 80 percent of the voters in the predominantly Cuban precincts voted for Ronald Reagan, and again in l984 when they gave Reagan over 82 percent of the vote (Malone, 1985: 4-5). Thus, the Cuban vote stands in stark contrast to that of other Latinos across the U.S. who have consistently supported the Democratic ticket by two-to-one margins. For instance, polls indicate that in 1988, Michael Dukakis received 70 percent of the Latin vote nationwide, whereas in Miami's heavily Cuban precincts, Dukakis only received 15 percent of the vote -- almost a five-to-one contrast between the votes of Cubans and those of other Latins across the country (see table 1).
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
Through an examination of 1988 election results as well as other data, this chapter analyzes the growing impact of the Florida Hispanic vote, and especially the role of Cuban voters and their strong loyalties to the Republican party, in state and national elections. Through such an analysis, we can at least begin to explain why Cubans in Florida have consistently voted differently from other Hispanics across the nation.
THE CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY OF HISPANIC PARTICIPATION
In the process of explaining Cuban support for the Republicans, we need to look at the overall demographics of Hispanics in Florida. One difficulty in conducting political research on Hispanics is the extent to which we generally lack widely agreed upon criteria in delineating which individuals fall under the Hispanic designation in the U.S. The census bureau, state and local agencies, polling organizations, etc. may all use different criteria. Spanish surname, country of origin, and self-identification are only three of the common means used by researchers and government agencies. As a result, wide variation and confusing discrepancies can arise over exactly what population certain statistics or observations refer to. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, the Hispanic designation is used broadly and somewhat generically, encompassing all people of Hispanic origin or descent, unless otherwise specified. However, given the unique make-up of Florida's Hispanic population and the unusual character of Hispanic politics in the state, the analysis most specifically focuses on those Hispanics who have settled in Florida since 1959, especially Cubans. It is this more recently arrived, largely Cuban population, disproportionately concentrated in the Miami area, that has been the locus of Hispanic political mobilization and incorporation in the state.
Based on the 1980 census, Hispanics made up only 8.8 percent of the state's total population, a rather small proportion when compared to the other Latino population centers in the United States. Miami, however, now ranks third in the nation, behind only Los Angeles and New York, in the size of its Hispanic population. When one considers that Miami has a substantially smaller overall population than either of these other two cities, and that almost all of the Hispanic population has settled in the city since 1960, it is of little surprise that Miami has undergone the single most dramatic ethnic transformation of any major American city in this century (Metro-Dade Planning Department, 1986).
Moreover, the 1980 census figures do not encompass the dramatic increase in the Latin population since that time, especially in Miami. According to local estimates, well over 70 percent of all Hispanics living in Florida reside in metropolitan Miami (i.e., Dade County). The 1980 census put the figure at 67.7 percent. However, once post-1980 immigration is taken into account (especially the Mariel boatlift, which accounted for approximately 100,000 additional Cuban refugees settling in Miami) as well as the census bureau's history of underestimating urban minority populations, one comes to realize that when analyzing Hispanic politics in Florida, one is essentially talking about the Cuban community in the Miami metropolitan area. For instance, the 1980 census estimated the state-wide Hispanic population at approximately 858,000. As of 1988, however, the number of Hispanics in Miami-Dade County alone was 879,500, of whom approximately 65 percent are Cuban. The fact that Cubans made up 80 percent of Miami's Hispanic population in 1970, does suggest that more recently, the non-Cuban population has grown at a faster rate, especially due to a dramatic rise in Nicaraguan immigration. However, these more recently arrived populations could not be said to have been a particularly important factor in the 1988 elections given their low rates of citizenship and marginal political mobilization.
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)
The state's Hispanic population is not only concentrated in the Miami area, but within Dade County distinctive neighborhood settlement patterns have also had a role in enhancing Hispanic political clout. Cuban-Americans have basically settled in three sections of Dade. The traditional concentration of Hispanics is the Little Havana section of the City of Miami, where Cuban refugees first settled in the early l960s. Sections of Little Havana range from about 70 to virtually 100 percent Hispanic, and most of the 239,400 Cubans in the City of Miami live in this section of town. The most rapid Hispanic growth in the county is taking place in the West Dade area, made up of the communities of Flagami, Sweetwater, Village Green, Westchester, West Miami and West Kendall, where hispanics make up over 60 percent of the population. The third area of Cuban concentration is the Northwest section of the county which consists of the cities of Hialeah, Miami Springs, and their surrounding neighborhoods. These areas range from 55 to 85 percent Hispanic. Such settlement patterns have not only resulted in Hispanics having a significant say in many municipal and county elections, but given that there have been single member districts in the state legislature since Florida's 1982 reapportionment, it also means that several state House and Senate districts have substantial Hispanic majorities, both in terms of overall population and registered voters (Malone, 1985: 32A; Warren, Corbett, & Stack, forthcoming).
In many respects, Florida's Hispanics have become politically significant in the state precisely because they are concentrated in Dade county. The same sized population, scattered throughout the state, would confront numerous obstacles to effective political organization. There would be only the weakest of bases for issue articulation and the promotion of candidates.
The Hispanic community in Dade traces its modern roots to Fidel Castro's revolutionary victory on January 1, l959. During the ensuing 30 years, more than 750,000 Cuban refugees arrived in the United States, most passing through Miami. By 1985, the census bureau put the number of Cuban's living in the U.S. at 1,036,000. Most Cuban-Americans settled in Miami or returned to the city after first settling in the North, and thus over half of the Cuban-American population lives in the Miami area.
Next to Miami, the second largest Hispanic concentration in the state resides in the Tampa area. Yet, while Tampa remains the site of one of the state's oldest and most established Hispanic communities, its Hispanic population is only about 8 percent as large as Miami's (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982). Also, much of the Tampa area's Hispanic population has resided in the state for at least three or four generations -- mostly descended from Cuban immigrants who came to Key West and Tampa during the late 1800's. Current Florida governor and former Tampa mayor, Bob Martinez, for instance, is of Cuban descent. Martinez, however, is representative of many of the third and fourth generation Hispanics, who due to long-term acculturation, cannot be said to be representative of a distinctive Hispanic political agenda in the state.
Thus, unlike California, New Mexico, or Texas where Hispanics (mostly of Mexican origin) have historically maintained a distinct presence, and whose Hispanic populations have expanded more gradually and more constantly, Florida has essentially experienced two fairly distinct periods of Hispanic immigration (one in the 1860's and 1870's, and the second since 1960), with the vast majority in both instances coming from Cuba (Warren, 1984; Gannon, 1984).
Also distinguishing Florida from many other states with large Hispanic populations is the fact that undocumented aliens do not constitute a significant portion of the Hispanic presence. While there has always been some movement of undocumented farm workers through the state, and while many of the more recently arrived Central Americans (especially Nicaraguans) remain in a state of legal limbo concerning their immigration status, it primarily has been Florida's undocumented Haitian population that has been affected by this issue. Even the large numbers of Salvadoran refugees who have settled in states such as California, have not been evident in Florida. In fact, the perception of variable, indeed privileged treatment of Cuban emigres at the hands of American policy-makers and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, has not only resulted in resentments between Cubans and Haitians in Miami, but also reinforces lines separating Cubans from Mexicans and Central Americans in other parts of the U.S. as well. Beyond the factors of national origin, length of residency, degree of acculturation, and immigration status, Florida's Cuban population is also quite distinctive from Latino populations in other parts of the country along socio-economic lines. As is well known, the Cuban exodus to the U.S. has been one of the very few predominantly middle class migrations in American history. The Cuban immigrants of the early 1960's were not the dispossessed under class of that country, but included many accomplished professionals who combined personal effort with an "open armed" immigration policy and substantial federal economic assistance in establishing themselves in Miami. Subsequent groups of Cuban entrants throughout the 1960's brought a large portion of the Cuban middle class as well as an upwardly mobile working class to Miami. While a myth of the "Golden Cuban" (i.e., that all Cubans are wealthy) persists, even in the face of a somewhat modest standard of living for many of the most recently arrived Cuban refugees (especially those who came during the Mariel boatlift), Cuban immigration in general has been accompanied by rapid economic incorporation. Overall, national census figures show that as of 1986, the median income for Cubans living in the U.S. was $26,770, as opposed to $14,584 for Puerto Ricans, and $19,326 for Mexicans (see table 3).
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
Thus, the poverty that is so frequently associated with new immigrant groups has been conspicuously absent in the Cuban immigrant experience. Ultimately, it is a combination of the numerical, economic, and political force of the middle and upper class Cuban community that has the greatest impact on both Florida and Miami politics. Taking this broader perspective in viewing Hispanic political clout in Florida, encompassing its social and economic dimensions, is essential. It is especially important, as suggested earlier, given the comparatively modest size of the state-wide Latin population when compared with states such as Texas or California.
As has been the experience with all immigrant populations coming to the U.S., size and economic success alone, do not directly translate into political muscle. Political incorporation encompasses myriad dimensions and complexities, not the least of which are the issues of citizenship and rates of voter registration. Voter registration figures are our best indicator of the size of the Hispanic voting population in Florida. Insofar as Florida state agencies have not generally maintained figures on Hispanic registrants, Dade County again serves as the most accurate source of information on the Hispanic population.
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)
As can be seen in table 4, not only has the number of registered Hispanics increased dramatically, growing by approximately 65 percent between 1979 and 1988, but their party affiliation has completely reversed during the same period of time. In less than 10 years, Democratic party registration among Hispanics in Dade County, dropped from 49 to 24 percent. The resultant increase in the ranks of Republican Hispanics has therefore been remarkable, increasing from 39 to 68 percent of all registered Hispanics. In fact, while overall Hispanic registration has increased by over 56,000 during the past nine years, Hispanic Democratic registration has faced a real loss of over 14,400. Thus, new Hispanic registrants are not only registering as Republicans, but voters are changing their registration, leaving the Democratic party by the thousands. Moreover, the Hispanic voter turnout rate in Dade County is often substantially higher than that for non-Hispanic whites and blacks -- averaging around six percent higher, but sometimes running significantly higher still in races with high Hispanic interest. Through the examination of all such indicators, one begins to see that while in Florida, Hispanics lack the clout to be a dominant force in state-wide elections, given their disproportionate Republican registration, geographic cohesiveness, and high turnout rates, they clearly do have the capacity to act as the "swing vote" in any close partisan contest.
It is also important to note that Dade County keeps figures on Hispanic registrants for purposes of complying with the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Thus only those Hispanics born outside of the U.S. and in Puerto Rico are counted as Hispanic registrants. The growing number of native born Latins in Miami, especially the children of Cubans who came during the 1960's, who are now able to vote, are not included in these figures, resulting in an underestimation of the size of the Hispanic voting bloc.
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)
Contrary to the contention often heard in Miami, that the younger Cubans will likely be more liberal and register Democratic, figures on new registrants in Dade County show the same strong tendency to register Republican among Cubans under the age of 30. During the two year period between January of 1986 and December of 1987, over 75 percent of the newly registered Cubans under 30 registered Republican. Among non-Cuban Hispanics, only 47 percent registered Republican (Malone, 1988).
PROFILE OF THE HISPANIC VOTE
The large Hispanic population of Dade County has had a profound influence on both local and state politics. In addition to the largely Hispanic precincts in Dade voting strongly Republican in the 1980, 1984, and 1988 presidential elections, a profile of other recent state-wide elections shows a similar process of declining support for the Democratic party among Cubans. The l982 Governor's race saw Bob Graham, a moderate incumbent from Miami, carry the Hispanic precincts of Dade County with about 60 percent of the vote against a weak Republican opponent. At the same time, another moderate Democrat, Lawton Chiles, was re-elected to the U.S. Senate, carrying a similar margin of the Latin vote. However, by 1986, the Cuban vote was firmly in the Republican column. Graham, who was now running for the U.S. Senate against a weak Republican incumbent, Paula Hawkins, received only about 24 percent of the vote in the Hispanic precincts of Dade, although he was able to carry the county with 56 percent of the vote (see table 6). Then, in the 1986 Governor's race, Republican Bob Martinez carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade over his Democratic opponent, receiving 79 percent of the vote. Thus, the pattern of disproportionate Cuban support for the Republicans was firmly established by the time of Florida's 1988 Senate race to fill Lawton Chiles' seat. In that contest, U.S. Representative Connie Mack carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade with over 80 percent of the vote in an otherwise extremely close race against Democratic House member Buddy McKay. Mack lost the county-wide vote, but the Latin bloc still proved to be a decisive factor in Mack's victory.
(TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE)
As suggested earlier, Cuban-Americans have also voted heavily for Republican candidates in State House and State Senate elections. Since 1980 GOP candidates have captured three seats in the State Senate and eight in the lower house largely due to the variable impact of district elections and a cohesive Hispanic voting bloc. After reapportionment, and a shift from multi- member to single-member House and Senate districts, the 1982 election brought a change in the Democratic domination of the delegation. Cuban-American Republicans captured three lower house seats in the newly created, heavily Hispanic districts. A fourth Cuban Republican lost by the narrowest of margins after the absentee ballots were counted. While not the first Cubans to serve in the Florida legislature (Fernando Figueredo of Key West served in the House during the 1885 session) 1982 marked the introduction of Cuban-Americans as a likely permanent fixture in state legislative politics.
In every election since 1982 Cubans have increased their strength in Tallahassee, and the trend is very likely to continue. It is interesting to note, that in 1988, the "Cuban-American Caucus of the House of Representatives" was formed, as opposed to a more generic "Hispanic caucus."
The changes among Hispanics in voter registration, documented in the previous section (see tables 4 and 5), is a phenomenon that, while not uniquely Cuban (insofar as a recent poll showed that one out of five Florida Democrats are considering changing their party), is particularly evident among Cuban voters, and just as importantly among elected officials and candidates. Prominent Florida Hispanics have abandoned the Democratic party in significant numbers, such as Governor Bob Martinez, State Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, and City of Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez.
For their part, the Democrats have tried to "win back" Cuban registrants, and have placed Cuban Democrats in prominent positions. Alfrdeo Duran, a Bay of Pigs veteran and former Dade County Democratic leader served as State Party Chairperson in the late 1970's. A Cuban-American presently serves as Dade County's party leader. But where Democrats can point to a certain number of Hispanics holding some key posts, the entire Republican party organization in Dade has become overwhelmingly Hispanic. Among office holders, Hialeah mayor, Raul Martinez is probably the most prominent Hispanic Democrat. During the 1988 session, one of the Cuban-Republicans in the House, Arnhilda Gonzalez-Quevedo, changed her affiliation to the Democratic party. There was considerable Democratic fanfare in the legislature, and she was given very desirable committee assignments. However, the political fallout in her home district was such that she did not seek re-election that November.
Despite these impressive gains for Florida's Hispanic Republicans, they still remain a distinct minority, even in Dade. As seen in table 5, Hispanics make up about 27 percent of the registered voters in Dade County. While the political fortunes of this group have risen rapidly, one must recognize the inherent limitations of constituting such a small proportion of the state's population. Thus, the Republicanism of Cubans has primarily reinforced state-wide trends toward party realignment, rather than being the moving force behind Republican ascendancy. For example, the strong support received from Hispanic Republicans was not enough to prevent the defeat of incumbent Senator Paula Hawkins by Bob Graham in 1986. Although, she won 76 percent of the Hispanic vote, she still lost Dade County by over 50,000 votes, and consequently, her seat. The Hispanic vote, while important for the election of Governor Martinez in 1986, was not the decisive factor in his victory either. Although, the strong support he received from Cuban voters did enable him to concentrate his time and resources on critical areas outside of South Florida.
To date, the most clear-cut case of the Hispanic vote being decisive, was in the 1988 senate racepreviously referred to. Connie Mack was able to defeat Buddy McKay in an extremely close election due to his 80 percent support in Hispanic precincts. But perhaps the clearest litmus test of overall Cuban electoral strength was the vote on Proposition 11. Proposition 11 was the "English as official language" amendment to the Florida state constitution. Hispanics were the only group that opposed the amendment, voting over 80 percent against the measure. However, the measure was approved by Dade County voters by 61 percent and passed state-wide with over 80 percent of the vote. The easy passage of Proposition 11 reflects the weakness of Hispanic voter strength in the state when they otherwise fail to form coalitions with other political forces.
EXPLAINING THE RESULTS
Cuban voting patterns and their loyalties to the GOP are not only contingent on an anti-Castro foreign policy or the enormous popularity of Ronald Reagan, but are also more and more dependent on the Republican party's ability and willingness to address the other political, social, and economic needs of the Cuban community. Cuban-American politics can no longer be solely understood in terms of militant exile politics. A more traditional brand of American ethnic politics has been emerging (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Olzak, 1983; Nielson, 1985). The significance and force of anti-Castro symbolism is still alive, but it has been combined with more mundane concerns for jobs, domestic social services, and other substantive policy concerns. Cuban-Americans are not only interested in electing staunch anti- Communists; they also expect their elected officials to serve the interests of their community. This tension between the "old" politics of exile and the new ethnic politics has created a two- dimensional voting pattern among Cubans. For offices that have great symbolic power, such as President and U.S. Senate, exile politics is still quite evident. On the other hand, for many state and local offices, ethnic politics and concern with servicing the community become preponderant2.
Although this metaphor of a dual political identity within the community is admittedly "too neat" to apply literally, it does help to explain the fact that Cubans do not vote uniformly Republican in all elections. Below the Presidential level, especially in Congressional elections, where local issues begin to take precedent over foreign policy issues, some Democratic candidates have demonstrated an ability to attract Cuban support. In the same election in which Cubans voted overwhelmingly for George Bush and Connie Mack, they also crossed partly lines in substantial numbers to help return three of Dade County's four re-elected Democratic Congressmen. Miami's Claude Pepper, for instance, continues to draw broad Cuban support as his House district has become predominantly Hispanic. His consistent support of the Nicaraguan Contras and Radio Marti, balanced against his domestic liberalism, has proved a winning combination, emulated by most other Democratic Congressmen from South Florida, including 1982 newcomer Larry Smith.
Originally given a new, fairly safe Democratic seat after the 1982 reapportionment, Smith's district witnessed a dramatic growth in the Hispanic population in the l980s. In 1984, while Smith was able to hold on to his seat against a strong Republican challenge (108,349 to 83,903), he lost that part of his district which encompasses heavily Hispanic western Dade County by a two- to-one margin (15,989 to 31,837). Smith's weak support among his Cuban constituents forced him to reassess his vote on Contra aid. In his l986 campaign, Smith wrote a letter to his Spanish surnamed constituents, explaining that from his seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, he engaged in a continuous struggle against world Communism. Smith's position won him the formal endorsement of the Cuban-American National Foundation in the l988 election, and he was able to carry the Dade County portion of his district for the first time.
Also illustrating the two dimensions of Cuban-American politics were the actions of the Cuban members of the state legislature, who recently broke ranks with the state Republican leadership and supported an urban liberal Democrat for Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives. As part of this new bipartisan urban coalition, Cuban Republicans have received desireable committee appointments.
Nonetheless, the basic Cuban support for the Republican party and its candidates is strong, and is largely due to five interlocking factors which combine in making the Cuban community unique among U.S. Hispanics. The Cuban community's strong anti- Communism; the formation of a viable enclave community; the economic incorporation of the expansive Cuban middle and upper classes; the opportunity to use the previously underutilized state Republican machinery as a vehicle for political mobilization; and the emergence of other institutional bases of influence such as the Cuban American National Foundation; all serve to explain the often remarkable levels of Cuban support for the Republican party.
Anti-Communism
Although it is no longer the "singular" Cuban issue it once was, preoccupation with Latin American Communism generally and Castro specifically, still stands as a core political issue in the community. The Republican party, with its reliance on hard- line foreign policy rhetoric, became their natural home. Network exit polling from the l984 Presidential election illustrates the foreign policy conservatism of the Dade county Cuban electorate (see Table 7).
(TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE)
This conservatism has been underscored by a series of public flaps in the Cuban community over the right of Cubans and non- Cubans alike to dissent from this anti-Castro consensus. The most infamous being in l986 when 2,000 angry Hispanics, mostly Cuban, attacked 200 anti-Contra demonstrators at Miami's Torch of Friendship monument. The Cubans pelted the anti-Contra rally with eggs, rocks, and an occasional glass bottle, forcing Miami riot police to bus the smaller group of demonstrators out of the area. The event attracted numerous public officials, the vast majority of whom sided with the counter-demonstrators. A Cuban radio station broadcast live from the site. The Mayor of Miami, added to the explosivity of the situation by referring to "Marxist groups" in the anti-Contra rally, and told the mostly Cuban crowd: "Unfortunately they have a right to be on the other side of the street (Wall Street Journal, 1986; Warren, Stack and Corbett, 1986)."
However, the anti-Communism issue has not by any means been limited to confrontations over substantive foreign policy questions. Frequently, symbolic politics and otherwise non- political events become the forums for such conflict. Anti- Communist fervor has been a regular part of municipal government deliberations, campaigns for local office, and cultural events. Plays by Cuban born playwright Dolores Prida and performances by Latino musical stars, such as Denise de Kalafe and Ruben Blades, have been canceled in Miami because these individuals have visited or performed in Cuba.
Notwithstanding some moderation on domestic issues, in many ways, anti-Communism has become a form of ethnic self- identification in the Cuban community -- resulting in this foreign policy conservatism being carried over to the next generation of Cuban-Americans.
The foreign policy conservatism of the Cuban community, especially as it is applied to Presidential and Senate races, helps to explain the community's support for Bob Graham during the Governor's race in 1982, followed by his rejection in the Hispanic precincts in his 1986 senate election. In the Governor's contest, Graham ran extremely well in the Cuban neighborhoods, carrying Hialeah with 64 percent, Miami Springs with 63 percent, Sweetwater with 59 percent, Little Havana with 57 percent, and the Westchester and West Miami areas with 60 percent of the vote. However, in l986 when Graham challenged conservative Republican Paula Hawkins for her Senate seat, Graham lost these very same Cuban neighborhoods by a three-to-one margin. Foreign policy stands also explain the disproportionate support in those same precincts for Connie Mack in the 1988 Senate race. Democratic contender Buddy McKay was viewed by most as a moderate, but he had been a consistent opponent of Contra aid.
The foreign policy conservatism of the Cuban-American community is one of the key reasons for the group's strong support for Republican candidates. However, while this explanation tells part of the story of the Cuban vote in l988, it leaves an incomplete picture. Republicans have not only captured the issues in tune with Cuban exile politics, but they have also become increasingly identified with the more mainstream issues of Cuban ethnic politics. Thus with regard to a diversity of issues, it is the GOP that has benefited from the creation of a Cuban-American enclave in Miami, the relative prosperity of Cubans, and the political empowerment of the community.
The Cuban Enclave
The formation of a Cuban enclave3 in Miami has also proven to be an important factor in explaining the Hispanic community's support for Republicans. The relative prosperity of the Cuban community and their large numbers in cohesive and contiguous neighborhoods have safeguarded the Cuban-American community to a large extent from the prejudice and discrimination that has plagued other Latins in the United States. The safety of the Cuban enclave has made the Democratic party less attractive to Hispanics in Dade. The Democratic party's strong civil rights record, which has attracted minority support for the party among other Latin groups in the United States, is generally not as relevant to local circumstances in Miami. Miami, in the view of many in the Cuban community, is essentially a Cuban city. Indeed, the only city in the world where more Cubans live, is Havana itself. The arrival of the Cubans greatly enhanced Miami's emergence as a center of international business, politics, literature and art. Travel writer David Rieff captures the essence of Cuban-Miami as he describes its transformation from an unspectacular American city to a Latin American capital city. "To be sure, the country of which Miami is the capital is an imaginary one, that of El Exilio, of the Cuban diaspora. But, if anything, Miami's fictive quality only magnifies its place in the lives of most Cuban-Americans (Rieff, 1987: 149)." This image of Hispanics making Miami uniquely "theirs" is reflected in a survey which showed that Anglos in Miami feel as much or more discrimination than do Hispanics (see Table 8).
(TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE)
Miami's Cuban community has gone a long way in dealing with the issue of discrimination through the development of its own anti-discrimination institutions, and through quick reactions to discriminatory behavior. The Spanish American League against discrimination (SALAD) is particularly noteworthy for its work in this area. Spontaneous citizen action also plays a significant role. For example, in the aftermath of the passage of Proposition 11, a supermarket clerk was suspended for speaking Spanish in front of customers. The Hispanic community's reaction was swift and effective. The store in which the incident occurred received over twenty bomb threats, picket lines were set-up, and the powerful Spanish-speaking radio stations began organizing a boycott of the supermarket chain. Less than forty- eight hours after the incident, the company announced that the clerk would be reinstated, the offending manager transferred out of Dade County, and the store issued a public apology to their Spanish-speaking customers. Currently, the chain is conducting an extensive campaign in the Spanish-speaking media to regain their share of the Hispanic market.
Economic Incorporation
The Latin community in Miami is not only relatively safe from discrimination but, as was shown in table 3, it is also far more prosperous than other Hispanic groups. The relative prosperity of the Dade County Hispanic population also contributes to the success of the GOP, reinforcing the essential conservatism of the Cuban middle class and its political-economic culture. After locating in Miami, the Cuban middle class developed an elaborate network of successful small enterprises, rather than relying on the public sector as a primary vehicle for upward mobility. This ownership of small businesses has likely reinforced attitudes toward government regulation and taxes that are more akin to the GOP than the Democrats. The proliferation of Latin businesses, primarily serving Latin tastes, also strengthens the Cuban enclave.
Miami ranks first in terms of the number of Hispanic-owned businesses relative to the size of the Latin population. The Cuban population is more than twice as likely to start their own businesses as other Latinos (Strategy Research Corporation, 1988: 88). Cubans have also been successful in the founding of larger corporations. Thirty-one of the top 100 Hispanic businesses in the U.S. are located in Dade County. Bacardi Imports of Miami is the nation's most profitable Hispanic owned business with total sales in excess of $500 million in 1987. The Cuban presence and their economic successes has also attracted Latin American tourists and capital, and resulted in scores of multinational corporations locating their Latin American offices in Miami.
While economic incorporation, in itself, has no immediate impact on voting and elections, it is also important to consider the extent to which Cuban economic power complements Cuban voting and political clout, especially in the areas of candidate recruitment, financial support for campaigns, and influence on policy-makers after they are elected.
Use of the Republican Party Machinery
Cuban loyalty to the Republicans is also attributed to the fact that the Republican party has been the historically under- utilized party in Florida. As with many of the immigrant groups who came to the U.S. in the late 1800's, the party of opportunity frequently is that party which is the weakest in the region. Like the Irish in Boston who seized control of the Democratic party's local machinery in the face of "Yankee Republicanism," the Cubans have become dominant in Dade County's Republican party, providing an "entree" for Cuban political activists and candidates. In the late 1970's, facing significantly less competition for party nominations, Cuban-Americans soon became a common fixture on the ballot in offering Republican opposition in what had formerly been one-party contests.
Other Institutional Bases of Power
Other institutional affiliations and actions only serve to complement and strengthen these ties to the Republican party. Of greatest importance has been the advent of the Cuban American National Foundation as one of the more powerful Hispanic organizations in the country. The foundation, founded in 1981, has quickly replaced the militant, sometimes violent Alpha-66 and Omega-7 groups as the principal Cuban political organization in the U.S. The Foundation's founders, mostly affluent, younger Cuban-Americans who had been active in Republican politics, were far more sophisticated than their predecessors. They organized a U.S. style political action committee in Washington to articulate the principle objectives of the Foundation -- namely, providing information on Cuba to Washington policymakers and providing information to Cubans still living in Cuba (Fernandez, 1987: 125). Radio Marti, the Foundation's project to broadcast radio programs to Cuba, has so far been the organization's most noteworthy policy achievement. In the wake of heavy Foundation lobbying, the bill to create the USIA run radio station received broad bipartisan support. Reagan actively supported Radio Marti, and Florida Senators, Paula Hawkins and Lawton Chiles, sponsored the bill. Moreover, all the Democratic Congressmen from Dade County (Pepper, Fascel, Lehman, and Smith) actively supported the radio station. Congressional approval of Radio Marti reflected not only the effectiveness of the Foundation's lobbying effort, and the president's active advocacy of the project, but also the electoral clout of Cubans in Florida, whose support was actively cultivated by Reagan and other Republican leaders. In 1988 and 1989, the institution of a "T.V. Marti" system has been at the top of the Foundation's agenda. They have also increased their involvement in state and local politics, making public endorsements of candidates, even in nonpartisan municipal contests.
At both the national and state levels, the political muscle of the Foundation as the principal lobbying organization for Cuban-Americans has been enhanced by the lack of any serious competition. For example, national Hispanic organizations have failed to establish even a toe-hold in Dade County. The United League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC) has at the least temporarily closed important avenues of cooperation between Cuban-Americans and other Hispanics when they called for the establishment of full diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba (League of United Latin American Citizens, 1984). Cuban-American leaders have used this endorsement to argue that the price of cooperation between national Hispanic organizations and Cuban Americans on domestic issues now includes the acceptance of diplomatic relations with Cuba and negotiations with Fidel Castro.
LULAC's foreign policy statements had made it more difficult to bridge the foreign policy gap between Cubans and other Hispanics. Congressmen Bill Richardson (D-NM) has been playing the role of peace-maker within the Latino community by calling for other Hispanic groups to understand the Cubans' preoccupation with anti-Communism (Richardson, 1985). Richardson, who is Chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, said that, "as a Democrat I am concerned about the tremendous inroads the Republican party is making among the Cubans. We Democrats have the responsibility of coming up with a more positive program, otherwise the Cuban realignment will be more rapid than people think (Miami Herald, 1985)."
In keeping with such verbal overtures, Richardson has supported Radio Marti, spoke out against the mistreatment of political prisoners in Cuba, and has become increasingly skeptical of the Sandinista regime. Richardson believes that if foreign policy differences can be bridged, there would be a basis for coalitions between Cubans and other Hispanics on domestic issues. Immigration, bilingualism, educational opportunity and the future of social programs are areas in which Cubans have shared interest with other Hispanics. Nonetheless, coalition politics is always a two-way street, and in the face of Cuban political and economic successes, as well as their strong links to the Republican party, it remains to be seen the extent to which Cuban leaders will demonstrate the necessary desire and capacity to compromise in the interest of laying a foundation for any broader coalition.
PROSPECTS
The mutually reinforcing nature of historical, economic, political, and cultural forces has created a conservative Hispanic enclave in the State of Florida. Moreover, indicators suggest that this trend is likely to continue into the 1990s. The assimilation of younger Cubans into the American mainstream has not yet diminished the essential conservatism of the community. Young Cuban-Americans, while being more politically sophisticated than their parents and less likely to tolerate violence as a means of political expression, continue to vote for Republican candidates in increased numbers.
Moreover, while larger numbers of non-Cuban Hispanics are emigrating to Miami, some immigration patterns indicate that the conservative enclave in Miami might be reinforced by new immigration. Anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans are now the second largest Hispanic group in Dade and the fastest growing in the state. Nicaraguans share the same anti-Communist foreign policy agenda as the Cubans and similar experiences as political refugees. The creation of the Nicaraguan National Foundation seems to indicate that the Nicaraguans will follow the Cuban lead and ally themselves with the Republican party. These demographic trends are also reinforced by the arrival of over 25,000 Cubans a year under the current Immigration agreement with Cuba and the ever present prospect of another Mariel-style influx. According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service over 1 million Cubans will leave the island if given the opportunity -- about as many as have already come to the U.S.
Both in the U.S. Congressional contests and in the state legislature, Hispanic political power should also increase with the 1992 reapportionment. Florida will likely gain three U.S. House seats, of which one will most certainly be in west Dade County. West Dade is the most rapidly growing neighborhood in the county and most of the population growth has been Hispanic -- both Cuban and Nicaraguan. Insofar as large numbers of conservative, Republican Hispanics have created some anxiety for the Democratic Congressmen who service that constituency, the establishment of a predominantly Republican Congressional district made up of West Dade, Hialeah and Miami Springs could create "safer" districts for the remaining Democrats. Hispanics will also likely gain another Congressional seat when the elderly Claude Pepper is eventually replaced. As suggested earlier, Pepper's district is largely Hispanic, and for years potential candidates have speculated and jockeyed for position in the event of an opening.
The l992 reapportionment will also witness increased Hispanic strength in the State legislature. Again, the rapidly growing Western section of Dade county will probably receive additional seats in both the state senate and the lower house. Moreover, as Cuban-Americans penetrate more into Miami Beach and North Miami, liberal Democratic politicians in those traditionally Democratic areas will find themselves in greater political peril.
All political, demographic and social indicators point to the possibility that the 1990s will be another decade of dramatic political gains for Dade County Hispanics. The Republican party will be the main beneficiary of the growing strength of conservative Hispanics. Along with increased political power for Cuban-Americans will come the responsibility of power. The challenge for the second generation of Dade's Hispanics will be if they can translate political power into tangible benefits for the Hispanic community generally, and the Cuban population specifically.
NOTES
1. Election data is based on the results from the 41 precincts in Dade county where Hispanics make up over 70 percent of the voters. The precincts are: 322, 324, 326, 332, 333, 335, 336, 403, 405, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 416, 417, 437, 439, 543, 544, 546, 47, 548, 549, 552, 554, 556, 558, 559, 560, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 570, 572, 574, 575. The results are from the official tabulation of the vote, Metro- Dade Election Department, November 8, 1988.
2.The notion of two concrete political dimensions in the evolution of a particular ethnic group's politics (i.e., exile politics vs. ethnic politics) is not established in the literature as such. However, there is important work that does speak to, 1) the extent to which foreign policy issues shape the domestic politics of immigrant groups, and 2) the gradual adoption by immigrant groups of values, tactics, and issues that are more in keeping with the American political mainstream, yet still distinct in in terms of the promotion of a particular ethnic political agenda. On the former point, see John F. Stack, Jr. 1979. International Conflict in an American City: Boston's Irish, Italians, and Jews, 1935-1944. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press. With regard to the second point, on ethnic group adaptation, see, Milton Gordon. 1964. Assimilation in American Life. New York: Oxford University Press. On the tendency of such groups to nonetheless maintain a distinct ethnic identity and agenda, even in the face of adopting more mainstream American political tactics, see, Andrew Greeley. 1967. The Catholic Experience. New York: Doubleday.
3.Alejandro Portes speaks to the self-sufficiency of the Cuban community, especially in economic affairs in his paper, "Modes of Structural Incorporation and Present Theories of Labor Immigration," presented to the conference on International Migration Studies, Bellagio, Italy, June 1979, pp. 16-19.
TABLE 1
MIAMI AND U.S. HISPANIC VOTE IN 1980, 1984, and 1988 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
U.S. Hisp. Vote (%)a Dade Hisp. Precincts (%)b
1980
Carter (D) 60 16
Reagan (R) 34 80
Anderson (I) 6 4
1984
Mondale (D) 66 18
Reagan (R) 34 82
1988
Bush (R) 30 85
Dukakis (D) 70 15
Source: a CBS/New York Times Exit Polls
b Metro-Dade Elections Department
TABLE 2
DADE LATIN POPULATION BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (1988)
Country of Origin Number of Persons % of Latin %ofTotal Cuba 573,400 65.2 27.6
Central American 146,000 16.6 7.0
South American 90,600 10.3 4.3
Puerto Rican 42,200 4.8 2.0
Others 27,300 3.1 1.3
Latin Population 879,500 100.0 42.3
Total Population 2,079,300 42.3 100.0
Source: Strategy Research Corporation, Miami, FL, 1988.
TABLE 3
ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR LATINS IN THE U.S. WORKFORCE
All Latin Cuban P.Rican Mexican All U.S.
Median Income ('86) $19,995 $26,770 $14,584 $19,326 $29,458
% Unemployed ('87) 10.2 5.5 11 11.7 7
% Poverty ('86) 25 13 38 25 11
% Professionals ('87) 13 22 14 11 25
% Laborers ('87) 22 17 23 23 15
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
TABLE 4
DADE COUNTY HISPANICa VOTERS BY PARTY REGISTRATION
June 1979 % March 1984 % March 1988 %
Democrats 53,710 49 52,516 39 39,269 24
Republicans 42,318 39 70,126 51 112,144 68
Independents 12,558 12 13,834 10 13,274 8
Total 108,586 100 136,476 100 165,274 100
Source: Metropolitan Dade County Department of Elections
a The "Hispanic" category only contains those Hispanics born outside of the U.S. or in Puerto Rico.
Table 5
VOTER REGISTRATION IN DADE COUNTY AND CITY OF MIAMI, MARCH 1989
Dade Miami
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Black 135,440 19.3 34,756 31.1
Hispanica 187,092 26.8 46,078 41.3
All Otherb 376,700 53.9 30,840 27.6
Total 699,232 100.0 111,674 100.0
Source: Metro-Dade Elections Department.
a The "Hispanic" category only contains those Hispanics born outside of the U.S. or in Puerto Rico.
b The "All Other" category is estimated to be 93 percent non-Hispanic white.
TABLE 6
HISPANIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES IN STATE-WIDE RACES
(DADE COUNTY PRECINCTS)
% Received in
Election Hispanic Precincts % of County Vote
1980: President 20 44
(Carter)
1982: Governor 57 72
(Graham)
1982: Senate 58 71
(Chiles)
1984: President 12 41
(Mondale)
1986: Governor 21 49
(Pajcic)
1986: Senate 24 56
(Graham)
1988: President 15 45
(Dukakis)
1988: Senate 20 53
(Mckay)
Source: Official Election Results, Metro-Dade Elections Department: 1982, l984, l986, and l988.
TABLE 7
CUBAN-AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES
Issue % in Agreement
Support Increase Defense Spending 86
Military Aid to Nicaraguan Contras 76
Oppose Normalization of Relations with Cubans 74
Source: Adapted from Manuel R. Gomez, "Cuban-American Political Behavior," presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April, 1985.
TABLE 8
SOUTH FLORIDA RACIAL AND ETHNIC ATTITUDES
People who said they or someone they know has faced discrimination in seeking a job or a promotion:
Group % Facing Discrimination
Anglos 14%
Blacks 34%
Hispanics 13%
People who said that another group would discriminate against them:
Group % Facing Discrimination
Anglos Blaming Hispanics 30
Hispanics Blaming Anglos 28
Blacks Blaming Hispanics 32
Blacks Blaming Anglos 40
Source: Miami Herald/Channel Six Poll, Miami Herald, February 27, l989.
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