

International Relations INR 3303
Foreign Policymaking

Fall 2005
T R 2:00 - 3:15 pm
Section 01

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Office: DM 436A
Hours: T R 4:00-5:00 PM

INR 3303 examines the way nation-states make their foreign policy. It is really *people* who occupy many different roles, of course, who actually make policy. This course will consider the international, domestic, and even interpersonal settings in which policymakers pursue their goals. Yet even knowing a good deal about the settings in which policy is made, and the goals policy makers hope to achieve, will not permit us to predict every foreign policy decision. Leaders "can't always get what they want," and analysts can't always predict what leaders will do. Indeed, policymakers often choose policies that, in retrospect, turn out to be unproductive or even damaging to their own (or their country's) interests. Nevertheless, this course will explore the ways that even seemingly irrational policies can often be explained in rational terms.

The first part of the course will explain what rationality means. The course then introduces a variety of ways the rationality assumption can be used to understand parametric choice in foreign policymaking. The second part of the course extends the metaphor of rationality to strategic problems of bargaining, negotiation, and coercion in foreign policy making. Finally, the course concludes by challenging and extending the rationality assumption.

Course Requirements

Class Participation: Attendance and active participation in class is essential to success in this course — the exams will cover material presented in the lectures that may differ from the assigned readings. It is important to *do the assigned readings before coming to class*: from time to time, you may be asked to summarize the readings in class, and there may sometimes be a brief, unannounced quiz on the readings. In the event that a class must be cancelled, you are still responsible for the assigned readings. Do not assume that a class is cancelled unless so informed by your professor or by a university representative *in person*.

WARNING: many sessions in this class, especially those noted with an asterisk (*) on the syllabus, build on each other. It will be very difficult to catch up if you miss or are unprepared for any of these classes. Do not take this course if you cannot make the commitment to be present in class on ALL of these days. You have been warned.

Homework: This course, unlike most other international relations courses, involves regular homework assignments. These will be announced or distributed in class (usually at the end of class) and will always be due at the beginning of the following class. Homework *will not be accepted for a grade at any other time*. It is the responsibility of each student to be aware of these assignments; if you must miss a class, be certain to contact a classmate for the assignment. *Late or incomplete homework assignments cannot be "made up,"* but your lowest grade will be dropped.

Exams: The exams are cumulative and will cover all lectures, classroom discussions, and reading assignments. We will discuss the format of the test in class before the exam. You will be permitted to take a make-up exam *only* in the event of illness or other serious extenuating circumstances. Exam dates are indicated on the syllabus (~~Exam 3 will be given during the final exam period, on Thursday, Dec. 15, 12:30 – 3:15 pm~~). Because the instructional schedule has been extended by one week due to Hurricane Wilma, classes will continue through December 15. The exam will be held during the last regular class period -- i.e., Thursday, Dec. 15.

Your grade will be determined on the basis of these course requirements as follows:

Homework and Class Participation	25%
Exam 1	25%
Exam 2	25%
Exam 3	25%

Academic Integrity

Be certain that you are familiar with the University's rules concerning academic misconduct as described in the Student Handbook. Cheating undermines the spirit of responsible inquiry on which the University relies. Cheating will result in severe penalties (which, according to University policy, may include a failing grade and/or expulsion from the University itself). Note that the Student Code of Conduct not only prohibits cheating, but also specifically prohibits allowing other students to cheat with your assistance or collusion.

Textbooks : The required texts for this course are:

1. A. Dixit and S. Skeath, *Games of Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2004).
2. Readings for INR 3303, "Foreign Policymaking" (from campus copy center).

Some additional material that may be helpful for students in this course is contained on the "student resources" page of my website (<http://www.fiu.edu/~kowitz/students.html>).

Questions? Problems?

You are always welcome to discuss this course or other academic issues with me during my office hours. I will also be happy to make an appointment for another time if you cannot see me during office hours. Don't hesitate to ask if you have any questions or problems. An easy and reliable way to contact me is by sending email to kowitz@fiu.edu.

Syllabus

(Please note changes in red as a result of Hurricane Wilma)

1. Tuesday, August 30

Introduction

Overview of course.

2. Thursday, September 1

The Nation and other Rational Actors

How is foreign policy made? On whose behalf?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 1.

Readings 1: Bueno de Mesquita, "Christopher Columbus and International Relations," pp. 23-37.

I. Rational Policymaking

3. * Tuesday, September 6

Defining Rationality and Utility

What is the difference between instrumental and value rationality? What is rational choice? What is expected utility? Do nations (or leaders) maximize utility?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 2.

Dixit & Skeath, Appendix, Part 1, pp. 221-228.

Readings 2: Bueno de Mesquita, "Christopher Columbus and International Relations," pp. 38-46.

4. * Thursday, September 8

Parametric Choice, Weapons, and War

What do nations want?

Readings 3: Bueno de Mesquita, "Planning the War Trap."

Readings 4: Woodward & Balz, "At Camp David, Advise and Dissent"

5. Tuesday, September 13

Parametric Choice and Trade

How is the international trading system defined? Does it determine a state's opportunities?

Readings 5: Krugman, "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession."

Readings 6: Prestowitz, "Playing to Win."

Readings 7: Thurow, "Microchips, Not Potato Chips."

6. Thursday, September 15

The Utility of Leaders

What do national leaders want? How do they get it?

Readings 8: Lowi, "The High Cost of Winning."

7. **Tuesday, September 20**

The Utility of Advisors

How do national leaders learn about their foreign policy options? Does the structure of their advisory group matter?

Readings 9: Janis, "Escalation of the Vietnam War."

8. **Thursday, September 22**

The Utility of Organizations

Does the military want what all bureaucracies want? Does it get it?

Readings 10: Allison, "The Imposition of a U.S. Blockade of Cuba."

9. * **Tuesday, September 27**

The "Public" Interest

How does public opinion constrain foreign policy in electoral systems? How does the structure of the domestic political system matter?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 15, pp. 524-530.

10. **Thursday, September 29**

MID-TERM EXAMINATION 1

II. Strategic Policymaking

11. * **Tuesday, October 4**

Game Theory

What is a game? What is the difference between parametric and strategic decision making? How can a game be shown in sequential form? What is rational in such games?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 2 (skim to review)

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 3.

Readings 11: Bueno de Mesquita, "Christopher Columbus and International Relations," pp. 46-55.

12. * **Thursday, October 6**

Game Theory

How can simultaneous-move games be shown in "strategic" form? What is an equilibrium? What is optimal? What is a dominant strategy?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, pp. 83-86, 90-99.

13. * **Tuesday, October 11**

Solving Games

What is a Nash equilibrium?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, pp. 86-90, 99-114.

14. * **Thursday, October 13**

Solving Games

Is the Nash equilibrium a good strategic "solution?"

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 5, pp. 131-145.

15. * **Tuesday, October 18**

Strategic Choice and the Security Dilemma

Why does a self-help system lead to security dilemmas?

Readings 12: Craig and George, "Balance of Power, 1815-1914."

16. **Thursday, October 20**

Deterrence and the Security Dilemma

What is deterrence? What does it require? When will it be successful?

Readings 13: Craig and George, "Deterrence."

Readings 14: Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad?"

17. **Tuesday, October 25** **Classes 16 & 17 held on Tuesday, November 1**

Crises and "Chicken"

What is compellence (or coercive diplomacy)? Why do leaders sometimes risk disaster? How can they avoid it?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 13.

Readings 15: Craig and George, "Coercive Diplomacy."

18. **Thursday, October 27**

Economics and Trading Dilemmas

How are economics and security connected? Why is it difficult to coordinate the production of "public goods?"

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 12, pp. 382-387.

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 12, pp. 403-414 (for terminology only, not math).

19. **Tuesday, November 1** **Classes 18 & 19 held on Thursday, November 3**

Review for Exam 2

No assigned reading.

20. **Thursday, November 3** **Class 20, Mid-Term Exam 2, held on Tuesday, Nov. 8**

MID-TERM EXAMINATION 2

III. Complications, Refinements, and Problems

21. * **Tuesday, November 8** **Class 21 held on Thursday, Nov. 10**

Repeated Games

How does repetition affect strategy?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 11 (skip appendix).

22. * **Thursday, November 10 Class 22 held on Tuesday, Nov. 15**

Mixed Strategies

What is an equilibrium strategy in a repetitive game?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 7, pp. 185-199.

23. **Tuesday, November 15 Class 23 held on Thursday, Nov. 17**

Mixed Strategies in Repeated Games

How can you keep your adversary guessing?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 7, pp. 212-216.

24. * **Thursday, November 17 Class 24 held on Tuesday, Nov. 22**

Multi-player Games

What is a collective action problem? How can collective action problems be solved?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 12, pp. 387-403.

25. * **Tuesday, November 22 Class 25 held on Tuesday, Nov. 29**

The National Interest Redux

Does it matter if nations are not really unitary? What is the Condorcet paradox? The agenda paradox? The Arrow impossibility theorem?

Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 15, pp. 500-524.

26. **Thursday, November 24**

THANKSGIVING HOLIDAY — UNIVERSITY CLOSED

IV. Ethics and Applications

27. **Tuesday, November 29 Class 27 held on Thursday, Dec. 1**

Ethics and Policymaking

What is the basis for an ethical theory of foreign policy?

No assigned reading.

28. **Thursday, December 1 Class 28 held on Tuesday, Dec. 6**

Ethics and Policymaking

Readings 16: Craig and George, "Problems of Ethical and Moral Restraints on the Use of Force in Foreign Policy."

29. **Tuesday, December 6 Class 29 held on Thursday, Dec. 8**

Are Leaders Rational?

What do psychological theories say about the rationality of human decision making?

Readings 17: Tetlock and McGuire, "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy."

Two classes added because of Hurricane Wilma -- see next page.

Two added classes:

30. **Thursday, December 8 Class 30, review session, held on Tuesday, Dec. 13**

Last Class Meeting — Review for Exam 3
No assigned reading.

31. **Thursday, Dec. 15**

FINAL EXAMINATION - IN CLASS