BOOK REVIEW

WHY THE CONFEDERACY LOST. Edited by Gabor S. Boritt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp 209, ISBN 0-19-507405-X.)

By BLAKE SCHUHMACHER, Rhodes College.

COPYRIGHT: Atlantic Millennium, Department of History Graduate Student Association, Florida International University, 1997.

In this collection of essays, Gabor S. Boritt has enlisted the help of five historians--James McPherson, Archer Jones, Gary Gallagher, Reid Mitchell and Joseph Glatthaar--to explore reasons for the Union defeat of the Confederacy. In his introduction, Boritt acknowledges the attempts of other historians to gain an understanding of the war, but he criticizes those attempts for failing to deal more closely with the means of war. Unlike those other efforts, the aim of this book is to "focus on military matters" of the Civil War as they pertain to the defeat of the Confederacy. (13)

James McPherson's objective in his essay, "American Victory. American Defeat," is not to come to a universal conclusion as to why the Confederacy lost, but instead to shed light on the issue. He looks at the question externally, that is, what elements contributed to Northern victory, as opposed to internally, or what took place within the Confederacy to bring about defeat. The author believes to be much more sensible. McPherson takes issue with many popular theses on the internal problems of the Confederacy leading to the outcome of the war. Such issues include the logistical aspects of the armies, the "internal conflict" thesis, and the "guilt" thesis. For each of these theses, McPherson refutes them through the use of examples of past wars, soldiers' diaries, and the "fallacy of reversibility" argument. This argument shows the North had the same problems as the Confederacy. McPherson believes the superiority of Union military leadership, management of military logistics and supplies, and executive leadership were influential factors which led to the Confederacy's defeat. McPherson also believes each battle, decision, and election should be understood in the context of when, how, and why they happened and the consequences of their happening.

Archer Jones's essay, "Military Means, Political Ends: Strategy," shows how military strategy was largely influenced by political objectives and public opinion. He distinguishes the difference between a military victory as opposed to a political victory. Jones clarifies this through examples of Rebel victories in battles, where they suffered far more casualties resulting in a greater depletion of their forces. He goes on to describe both Union and Confederate military strategies as Napoleonic, and demonstrates the implementation of those strategies. Jones gives detailed explanations of how those strategies played out. He gives his opinion on what caused the Confederacy to fold, stating that the soldiers and civilians no longer had the political motivation to continue the war. The price of independence for the Rebels became too high for them to sustain an effective opposition to the Union.

The third essay in this compilation, "Upon their Success Hang Momentous Interests," Gary W. Gallagher looks closely at the three generals whose decisions, he believes, most influenced the war: Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and William Tecumseh Sherman. Gallagher also believes that it was these generals' decisions on the battlefields which led to a chain reaction that determined the internal problems of the Confederacy documented by historians ever since. He critiques the popular portrayal of each general and offers his own views on their impact. Gallagher goes into great detail about Lee whether or not he had a positive or negative effect on the Confederate war effort as a whole. He points out that it was Lee's positive effect on the Confederate morale which most helped the South. He scrutinizes these three generals because as he sees it, "to a significant extent those three officers determined not only which side would win but also how long the contest would last." (108)

In "The Perseverance of the Soldiers," Reid Mitchell deals with the ideology and morale of the Northern forces and their profound influences on the Union victory. Mitchell discusses the reasons for the vast amount of volunteers for the Unions Army in 1861--a great sense of duty, patriotism, unionism, and youthful enthusiasm motivated participation. He also analyzes the effect the Emancipation Proclamation had on soldiers' thoughts on the reasons for the war. Mitchell addresses how the Union army was able to reenlist over half of their forces in 1864. By doing so he shows that the morale of the Union forces remained largely unchanged from 1861 when men rushed to enlist. The author also speaks of Confederate demoralization and attributes it to the lack of rations, clothing, inevitability of defeat, and problems on the homefront. Those problems at home were largely due to the crumbling of the institution of slavery. Mitchell explores the fall of slavery and fear of a slave rebellion as reasons for Confederate desertion. He ends his essay by stating that the Union won because their forces remained in the field. Mitchell asserts that had the Rebels remained in the field the conflict would have developed into total brutality.

The final essay in Boritt's book is written by Joseph Glatthaar. "Black Glory: The African-American Role in Union Victory," takes a close look at what effect the Negro soldier had on the war. He chronicles the black soldier's attempt to enlist in the army beginning in 1861 until the end of the war. Glatthaar shows how it was not easy for blacks to gain entry into the Union army until there was a great demand for an increase in manpower in 1863. He explains how the timeliness of their enlistment resulted in the ultimate victory of the Union. Glatthaar gives examples of battles in which black battalions gained much respect and even admiration from white soldiers. It was eagerness to fight for the cause which Glatthaar believed made the black man a good soldier. African-Americans who served in the Union army not only hurt the Confederacy in military terms but also economically. Glatthaar explains how the slaves seeking asylum in the Union army were severely detrimental to the Southern way of life. Slaves were the work force in the South during the war, and as more and more fled, the already diminishing resources became almost nonexistent. Glatthaar does not concede that it was the black soldiers who won the war outright for the Union, but he does compare them to the doughboys of World War I. He states that "blacks helped to make the difference between a victory and statement or defeat." (161)

Boritt did an excellent job compiling essays which fulfill his aim of looking at the reasons why the Confederacy lost from a military standpoint. Each of the individual authors clearly state their objectives and they give adequate evidence to support those objectives. Boritt does not claim to solve the question of why the Confederacy lost, but he does provide an interesting and logical compilation of essays which raise points which need to be examined. McPherson said, "If definitive truth were possible in history, historians would soon have nothing left to write about." (18) Why the Confederacy Lost will give readers valuable insight on the subject for the use while pondering the question of why the Confederacy lost.