In every great war there are personal tragedies in which men of great ability, sometimes through a mistake of their own, sometimes through unhappy relationship with their superior officers, sometimes through government interference, and sometimes because they fall into popular disfavor, end their military careers in disappointment and sorrow. One of these tragedies in the Civil War was that of Don Carlos Buell, who brought his Army of the Ohio to Grant's rescue at Shiloh, fought the bloody battle at Perryville in Kentucky, fell into disfavor with Halleck and the administration, and was relieved.(1)
One of the most controversial and least understood figures in the military of the Civil War, Don Carlos Buell, was thought by some to have been unfit to command even a regiment; to others he was a genius of the art and science of war, who was sacrificed for political reasons.(2) How was it possible for this man to be accused of gross incompetence, sheer stupidity, and even disloyalty in his military activities during the war? A close examination of the evidence indicates that, contrary to the views of most writers on the period, Buell was not only a most-able organizer, drill master, and disciplinarian, but he was also a soldier of superior strategic and tactical ability comparable to many of the other prominent generals on both sides. Political enmity towards him was largely his undoing. The fact that Buell was a Democrat, favoring gradual emancipation with compensation to the slave owners, made many the Radical Republicans in Congress angry.
This essay will describe and analyze Buell's military activities in the Civil War. It will attempt to remove the stereotype into which he has often been cast. Since military policy and actions seldom function in a vacuum, attention must be given in some degree to political pressures which influenced the military events. Several scholars of the Civil War suggest that the importance of the activities in the West at the beginning of the war have been disregarded in the literature.(3) The military successes of the Union in the western campaign during 1861-1863 played an integral part in the following success of the Northern side for the second half of the war effort. Don Carlos Buell was a significant actor in the first half of the Civil War drama as head of the Department of the Ohio when this department took an active part in the Battle at Shiloh, the occupation and control of Tennessee and Kentucky, and, ultimately, at the decisive battle in Perryville.
General Buell was a West Point graduate and a veteran of the Seminole and Mexican wars. According to J. L. McDonough, the General was
stern in expression, formal in manner, and stocky in physique--sometimes he displayed his arm and upper-body strength by clasping his wife about the waist, holding her off the floor straight out before him, and then lifting her to sit on a mantle--Buell possessed a good mind and conveyed the image of a successful, albeit somewhat withdrawn, leader of men.(4)
Other opinions expressed about Buell, by his peers, added to the high regard in which he was held. General William Farrar Smith, one of the Union's most respected generals, described Buell in his unpublished memoirs as "a capital soldier and a student in his profession. He fought a battle with courage, coolness, and intelligence, saving us from utter rout at Shiloh, into which false position Halleck's ambition and Grant's density had begotten us."(5)
Before Buell was placed in command of the Army of Ohio in 1861, he had been employed in the Adjutant General's Department prior to the war, then he was quickly made a brigadier general during Lincoln's mad scramble to establish a Union Army. Initially, he was occupied with assisting General George B. McClellan, General-in-Chief, with the organization of the Army of the Potomac. As of November 12th, 1861, when he was forty-three, the assignment of Buell as General of the Department of Ohio had been established, as was made clear in a letter from President Lincoln to Joseph Holt. In the letter Lincoln explains why he could not answer Mr. Holt's request for consideration of a particular placement in the Louisville area: "Gen. McClellan had already so nearly completed his plans for the Departments of the West . . . that I could scarcely ask him to re-arrange them. Halleck goes to St. Louis, and Buell goes to Louisville."(6)At this point it becomes possible to examine the actions of Don Carlos Buell as a leader of men. He had been given a massive responsibility-to help create and determine the shape of the war in the West.
Analysis of Buell's philosophy of war is significant in order to comprehend his actions. Buell, like his friend and ally McClellan, believed in tactical warfare. He favored a maneuver rather than a fight to achieve victory. Buell himself stated that "The object is not to fight great battles, and storm impregnable fortifications, but by demonstrations and maneuvering to prevent the enemy from concentrating his scattered forces." (7) The negative outcome for Buell of this 'style' of warfare was that for the ordinary observer of military events, or even for President Lincoln and his advisors in the capitol, there were no clear cut and dramatic outcomes by which his effectiveness could be assessed. Other military experts were able to appreciate the forward steps being taken and the fewer numbers of men lost. The northern public (and the politicians concerned with the impressions of the voters) were unable to appreciate the successes of Buell's philosophy. What ensued, once he was assigned the responsibility of the Army of the Ohio, was an example of military politics conflicting with military philosophy. Buell was not a political man, he was more interested in carrying out military ideals than in catering to the demands of individuals concerned with the possibility of losing votes. For the political purposes of the Civil War, clear and obvious military victories (with little regard to the number of casualties) were necessary to keep the public encouraged of success.(8) Ulysses S. Grant was occupied with providing spectacular victories (Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh, for instance), a style for which Grant was well rewarded. Buell, on the other hand, was preparing and maneuvering to his advantage.
Another conflict between Buell and the political forces around Lincoln was that he "loathed abolitionists and wanted to protect the constitutional rights of Southerners so as not to further widen the 'breach' between the North and the South."(9) As a staunch Democrat, like McClellan, he was not prepared to wage the style of 'total' war that developed after 1863. He believed that "the commander merits condemnation who, from ambition or ignorance or a weak submission to the dictation of popular clamor and without necessity or profit, has squandered the lives of his soldiers."(10)
When Buell assumed responsibility of the Department of the Ohio he was following William T. Sherman, who had buckled under pressure and stated to McClellan: "The future looks as dark as possible. It would be better if some man of sanguine mind were here." (11) McClellan granted Sherman's request for transfer and furlough, leaving Buell to set things in order. The situation that had worn out Sherman was the need to establish sufficient forces to protect the border. The western border stretched from eastern Kentucky to southwest Missouri and contained approximately 90,000 troops. Buell began the daunting process without any preexisting plan of action. The first step Buell took was to create an army out of the "heterogeneous mass" of local volunteer regiments. His determination to instill discipline within the volunteer ranks quickly made it necessary to be in direct control of the process and this led to more political conflicts. Governors of each state were responsible for the recruitment of volunteer regiments and they were adamant to maintain control of these recruits. When Buell made it clear to Tennessee's Governor, Andrew Johnson, that he expected himself to be in charge of the volunteer regiments (which was the General's prerogative) he earned a staunch political enemy who played a significant role in Buell's future.
During the winter of 1861-62 Buell was occupied with the disciplining and training of these troops and did not take active part in any conflicts until he easily captured Bowling Green and Nashville as part of his advance into the territory. At the same time Grant was having dramatic successes at Forts Henry and Donelson and deflecting Confederate forces from Buell's path. Despite the clear advances of the Union forces, McClellan was replaced by Henry W. Halleck as General-in-Chief, on March 12th, 1862. Buell's close relationship with and similarities to the downgraded McClellan were an added complication to his already precarious political position. The new General-in-Chief, Halleck, with whom Buell had often had conflicts when they were of equal rank, now became his superior and imposed his own philosophy of limited warfare on Buell, Grant, McClellan, and other Union generals. Still as Commander of the Army of the Ohio, Buell pushed on to meet with Grant at Pittsburgh Landing. Before their two forces could join, Grant came in contact with General Johnston and his forces on April 7th at Shiloh. Buell reached Shiloh the following day and is credited with having helped turn defeat into a victory for the Union. The following victory for the Union was the joint venture in Corinth, Mississippi, a Confederate stronghold.
After these combined efforts, during the early summer of 1862, Buell proceeded in the President's much desired advance into East Tennessee, where there was a stronghold of Union loyalists. Buell intended his move from Kentucky into eastern Tennessee to be a permanent move and took the time to repair, maintain, and protect rail lines that would provide his soldiers with their only means of support in food, ammunition, weapons, and other supplies. The process was slow and time-consuming. Halleck had other plans for Buell, however, that "placed his army on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which ran south of the Tennessee River for eighty miles, forced him into a barren countryside infested with Confederate cavalry."(12) The Confederate Army's cavalry, under the leadership of Generals Forrest and Morgan, used guerilla tactics and successfully delayed Buell's progress by damaging these precious rail lines. The cavalry was able to make quick unexpected forays into Union dominated areas, striking at vulnerable points in the necessary rails where large frontal attacks were not possible, and then vanishing into the mountainous terrain already familiar to the Confederates.
The slowness of Buell's advance towards the prize, Chattanooga, was due to many complications. Halleck criticized him and urged him to speed up his process. Lincoln wrote to Halleck, very simply on July 13th: "They are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it. A. Lincoln."(13)Lincoln referred to the repeated cavalry attacks by Morgan's men and Halleck relayed the orders to Buell on the 14th: "Do all in your power to put down the Morgain [sic] raid even if the Chattanooga expedition should be delayed." (14) Buell's army was living hand to mouth. On July 13th, the same day Lincoln advised Halleck to produce results from Buell; Buell's chief of staff, James B. Fry, wrote the Louisville quartermaster, "The army will starve unless there is more activity in throwing supplies forward."(15) Forrest's cavalry struck the rail lines necessary for 'throwing' supplies forward" on the same day and delayed Buell's advance. Washington expressed displeasure with the pace of progress.
"Buell's great problem, which became worse as the army advanced, was how to feed his army."(16)Throughout the summer the most remarkable outcome of this campaign towards Chattanooga was the fact that Buell was able to continue his mission. The number of soldiers deemed necessary for the occupation of these regions, the amount of supplies required to maintain and arm the troops, and the tactical effectiveness of the guerrilla attacks wore down the morale of the Department of the Ohio. The soldiers lost faith in Buell's ability as the summer wore on. Buell's army was situated, in mid-July, in the middle of Tennessee where Confederate armies had preceded them and had already consumed what supplies were available in the vicinity.
Buell increased the soldiers' dissatisfaction by dealing very harshly with any form of looting or pillaging of native supplies. The General's punishment of his soldiers was so severe, and his recompense towards the local inhabitants so just, that his subordinates began to grumble that he must be a rebel sympathizer. Buell intended to protect and maintain the property of civilians as a part of his overall philosophy. He believed that the potential support and the rights of the local citizenry were too important to allow abuse or mistreatment of the community members. Buell strove to communicate his belief to his soldiers-"We are in arms, not for the purpose of invading the rights of our fellow countrymen anywhere, but to maintain the integrity of the Union and protect the Constitution."(17) General Buell's perspective was referred to as a 'Rosewater Policy', which was the term coined by Union newspapers to refer to lenient treatment of the enemy. This leniency had been the government's policy as well, but the citizenry of the Union was beginning to change their opinion. As the war dragged through a second summer, the demand for a 'hard war' was increasing. Two laws passed during the 37th Congress reflected this change: the militia act, requiring the conscription in nine month terms; and the confiscation act, that confiscated the property of traitors as punishment.
The event of the summer of 1862 in the Western Theater was the invasion of Kentucky by Confederate General Braxton Bragg and his army. On August 22nd, Buell received the news that Bragg, moving north from Alabama, had crossed the Tennessee River west of Chattanooga with fifty regiments. Buell responded by retreating his headquarters north to Nashville, Tennessee, notifying his political foe, Governor Andrew Johnson, of his intention on August 30th. This decision was met with alarm by the Governor, who communicated to the President his concern about the potential of being invaded by the Confederates and expressing complete lack of faith in Buell. Lincoln sent telegrams in many directions, attempting to determine Bragg's location. On September 7th Lincoln asked Buell, "What degree of certainty have you, that Bragg, with his command, is not now in the valley of the Shenandoah, Virginia? A. Lincoln."(18) Buell telegraphed the President on September 10th that Bragg was still on the eastern side of the Cumberland Mountains. He explained that Bragg's
movements will probably depend on mine. I expect that for the want of supplies I can neither follow him nor remain here. Think I must withdraw from Tennessee. I shall not abandon Tennessee while it is still possible to hold on. Cut off effectually from supplies, it is impossible for me to operate in force where I am; but shall endeavor to hold Nashville, and at the same time drive Smith out of Kentucky and hold my communication.(19)
The Army of the Ohio, under-supplied, frustrated by lack of action, and tense from repeated drills and practices, was going to see action again. The long summer had culminated in a stand-off between the Union and Confederate forces.
Each side scrambled to ascertain whatever they could of the opposite force. Buell stood ground in Nashville, confident that the supply and communication lines to the city were securable. Bragg and his forces had advanced north into Kentucky by September 7th, through the eastern half of Tennessee, and then headed toward the forces of Confederate General Kirby Smith. Smith had earlier reported to Bragg on August 20th from Barboursville, Kentucky, complaining that the roads were more difficult than expected. The two advancing flanks seemed intended for Louisville, Kentucky.
There was some speculation that Bragg was really trying to draw Buell's forces away from Nashville into Kentucky. Nashville was such an important supply and communication line that there was great evidence that the Confederates were hoping to regain the city. Buell seemed to be paralyzed and there were wild rumors circulating about his command.(20) Buell, on the other hand, refused to be lured away; he feared that Bragg actually intended to capture the vital location of Nashville. Not until September 16th did Buell leave Nashville with the majority of his forces to head off Bragg from Louisville. Buell's army reached Louisville on September 24th after a hard march. On September 30th Lincoln, fed up with lack of direct confrontation from Buell, ordered Buell's subordinate, General George H. Thomas, to take command of the army. Thomas refused. General Thomas defended Buell's actions, stating that the army was on the verge of confronting the Confederates. Buell's style of maneuvering rather than fighting had frustrated many; however, the result was that Buell had lost few men. He had also counted on the fact that Bragg was facing the same problem he was: the lack of supplies that he contended with while he occupied eastern Tennessee. Bragg retreated from confronting Buell in Louisville due to this lack, as well as uncertainty about the true numbers of Buell's army.
While Bragg's much publicized march into Kentucky was taking place, other events took place in the Eastern Theater and in Washington that would have a direct effect on Buell's future. The Battle of Antietam had been waged on September 17th, and Lincoln had delivered the Emancipation Proclamation to his Cabinet. Both of these events marked a turning point in the attitude of the Administration towards a 'soft war.' The demands of the Radical Republicans finally established a change in policy that would make Buell's philosophy of war untenable. Just as McClellan would be eased out of his position in the Eastern chain of command, so would Buell, despite his ensuing success against General Bragg.
On October 7th, at a little town in central Kentucky known as Perryville, Buell put his plan into effect. "General Buell's plan had been to keep the Rebels guessing about his line of advance. The strategy worked marvelously, aided by Bragg's strongly-held conviction that Buell could not take the field for several weeks anyway."(21) By launching a feint northwards, Buell successfully fooled Bragg into thinking that Union forces were much larger than they were truly. The harsh reality of the circumstances each side contended with was that, above and beyond lack of general supplies, both armies were now searching for water. Perryville, just southeast of Louisville, offered a supply of water that both forces were eager to claim. The Battle of Perryville on October 8th was registered as a victory for the Union, but there were substantial casualties to the northern forces. Bragg "had thought he was confronting only a small portion of Buell's force."(22) When he realized the numbers facing him, he retreated and Buell pursued. The two Generals confronted each other but neither made the move to attack. Buell knew that reinforcements were on their way from the north and he chose to pursue Bragg without initiating battle in order to maintain the numbers of soldiers he had left. Bragg was weighing his overall lack of supplies and recruits and chose to avoid confrontation as well. What ensued was the retreat of Bragg's forces into Tennessee, with Buell following close behind with his bruised army.
During the period while Buell was dealing with Bragg, the President was changing the position of the Administration's war policy. On September 22nd the President presented the Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet. "After the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation....it was almost too much to expect the administration to retain in high command such conservative democrats as McClellan and Buell."(23) By October 12th, President Lincoln telegraphed that he "was anxious to hear from Gen. Buell's Army. We have had nothing since day before yesterday. Have you any-thing?"(24) The President, balancing his administration of the war effort and the political demands of republicans clamoring for proof of Union progress, decided that Buell's non-combative pursuit of Bragg through Kentucky was to be the last evidence of 'soft-war' tactics he could politically tolerate.
When Bragg had clearly and decisively been driven from Kentucky back to Tennessee, Lincoln relieved Buell of his command on October 24th. Buell was the first military sacrifice offered to the political faction blaming the military for lack of progress against the South. The timing of Buell's dismissal, just close enough to the November elections to make the headlines and benefit from word of mouth, served the purpose of projecting a "tough on soft generals" platform politically viable. General McClellan, Buell's close friend and ally, soon followed. Others were also dismissed. Lincoln's response to one Major John J. Key, on November 24th, is noteworthy:
In regard to my dismissal of yourself from the military service, it seems to me you misunderstood me. I did not charge, or intend to charge you with disloyalty. I had been brought to fear that there was a class of officers in the army, not very inconsiderable in numbers, who were playing a game to not beat the enemy when they could, on some peculiar notion as to the proper way of saving the Union. (25)
Lincoln knew that the philosophy and policy of the administration and the military had at one point been in concert. The generals who had conducted their affairs according to this former shared perspective had done so with the confidence that the President understood and supported them. Don Carlos Buell certainly believed that he had been conducting his departmental affairs effectively. After his dismissal he demanded that his actions be investigated by a military commission. The commission found that Buell had not committed any unreasonable mistakes during his tenure as General of the Army of the Ohio. The results of the Commission were never shared with the public.
The details of the activities in this affair are intriguing. Bragg's failed invasion of Kentucky is credited with serving as a negative turning point for the Confederacy. Kentucky historian James L. McDonough summarizes that "despite missed opportunities, the campaign turned into a great strategic triumph, from the Union perspective, when the rebels not only failed to gain Kentucky, but also were unable to inflict any serious damage to the western Federal forces." (26) Curiously, in spite of this outcome, General Buell was not given any new command. He returned to Indianapolis in the spring of 1863, awaiting orders that did not come.
General Sherman mentions in his memoirs of the war that when General Grant was placed in command of the Union forces as General-in-Chief, on March 18, 1864, he
discussed the possibility of restoring to active service such distinguished officers as McClellan, Fremont, Buell, Crittendon, and others 'who had, by the force of events, drifted into inactivity and discontent'. Grant wanted to bear in mind particularly Buell, McCook, and Crittendon.(27)
.
The immediate reaction to the possibility of Buell's reinstatement was a direct complaint from Governor Andrew Johnson to the President. Johnson had not forgotten his animosity towards Buell and used his influence to make Buell's new commission politically complicated. Sherman did not hear from Grant again on the issue and Buell was marshaled out of the volunteers on May 23rd, 1864. On June 1st, he resigned his regular commission. Buell became a businessman in Kentucky after the war.
Many historians concur that the study of "both Union and Confederate operations in the western theater, in the weeks and months following Shiloh, have received relatively little attention."(28) The Civil War of the United States is a thoroughly researched, documented, and discussed period of United States history, and it remains a dramatic landmark in the development of this nation's identity. Strangely, the career and political handling of Don Carlos Buell are barely acknowledged in the volumes of studies on the Civil War.
Perhaps General Buell, and his closest ally General McClellan, seem to have been overlooked in these studies because they represent an ongoing struggle in the identity of the Civil War. The dramatic moral purpose imposed on the conflict between the states has tended to be defined by the Emancipation Proclamation; however, this moral stance was not declared until the war had already been in effect for over a year. Buell has been overlooked by historians because he did not fit ideologically or politically with the identity that emerged following the war. He was politically moderate and his military actions reflected this perspective. A meticulous examination of the circumstances of his career leads to the discovery of an under-recognized military talent, who was put aside as a result of the political complexities of Lincoln's Administration and the Union's changing war policy.
NOTES:
1. Clarence Edward Noble Macartney, Grant and His Generals(Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1953), 224.
2. 2 General Buell was strongly admired by his military colleagues, other generals such as Grant, Sherman, McClellan; however he was equally strongly disliked by political contemporaries, such as Governor Andrew Johnson, who disliked Buell's disinterest in the machinations of wartime politics.
3. 3 For a discussion of this see J.L. Mc Donough, War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994); G.J. Propokowitz, "All for the Regiment: Unit Cohesion and Tactical Stalemate in the Army of Ohio, 1861-1862," Dissertation Abstracts International 55-08, Section A, 2543; S.D. Engle, "Don Carlos Buell: Military Philosophy and Command Problems in the West," Civil War History, 41:89-115.
4. 4 McDonough, War in Kentucky, 42.
5. 5 Macartney, Grant and His Generals, 221.
6. 6 D. E. Fehrenbacher, Lincoln: Selected Speeches and Writings(New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 318.
7. 7 Engle, "Don Carlos Buell," 92.
8. 8 For insight on this issue, see Brian Holden Reid, "General McClellan and the Politicians," Parameters 17(1987):101-112; Lance Janda, "Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880," Journal of Military History, 59 (1995): 7-27; and E. J. Hess, "Alvin P. Hovey and Abraham Lincoln's 'Broken Promises': The Politics of Promotion," Indiana Magazine of History, 80 (1984):35-50.
9. 9 Engle, "Don Carlos Buell,"94.
11. 11Macartney, Grant and His Geberals, 270.
12. 12 Engle, "Don Carlos Buell," 105.
13. 13 Feherenbacher, Lincoln, 322.
15. 15 Engle, "Don Carlos Buell,"107.
16. 16 McDonough, War in Kentucky, 43.
20. 20The constant telegraph communications between the President and his commanding Generals are well documented. President Lincoln was consistently concerned by Buell's style of leadership, and seemed to always be pushing Buell towards greater aggressive action, either directly or through Buell's superiors; see Fehrenbacher's Lincoln.
21. 21 McDonough, War in Kentucky, 304.
23. 23 W. W. Hassler, George B. McClellan: Shield of the Union (Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1971), 319.
24. 24 Fehrenbacher, Lincoln, 458.
26. 26 McDonough, War in Kentucky, 325.
27. 27 Macartney, Grant and His Generals, 291.
28. 28 McDonough, War in Kentucky, 3. McDonough specifically examined the western theater, but there are others-Propokowicz, Engle, Chumney-who have concentrated on this arena.