PHI 3300 Epistemology  Dr. Hauptli  Spring 2009  Second Paper Topics

 

     Copyright © 2009 Bruce W. Hauptli

 

You are to critically respond to one of the following topics.  Such a critical examination should: (1) indicate the nature of the position being examined; (2) clarify the argument for and/or against the position; (3) examine the strength of the argument by considering possible responses, counter-arguments, or counter-examples; and (4) offer your own critical assessment of where the arguments for and against the position being considered leave us—should we accept, reject, or remain neutral regarding this orientation, view, or position? 

 

     As the first paper assignment indicated, one of my purposes in requiring you to write these papers is to offer you the opportunity to perfect your ability to describe carefully a complex position and argument to others.  Another of my purposes is to provide you with the opportunity to push beyond the level of reading and mastering the required material for the course.  Here my goal is to provide you with an opportunity to engage in critical reflection upon the readings (or upon related readings and issues), and to provide you with feed-back on your critical scrutinies. 

 

     One of my vehicles for accomplishing these goals is to require that you write more than one paper.  While your second paper will be on a topic differing from your first one, many of the comments I made on your first paper could be helpful to you in perfecting your compositional, expository, and critical skills.  These comments will only be useful if you give them some serious scrutiny however.  I strongly encourage you to look over both the typed comments and the marginal comments throughout your first paper.  Few students have such an exceptional ability that they can not benefit from such an examination, and to encourage you to take the comments seriously, I want you to know that before I read your second paper I will be reviewing my file with these comments on your first paper.  I expect that your editing of your drafts of your next paper will be done in light of these comments.  You should seriously endeavor to avoid any of the sorts of compositional errors I have identified, and to the extent that it is called for, I also encourage you to work to make your next exposition and critique yet clearer and more forceful.  Further information including the due date follows the topics. 

 

Topics:

 

1. In his Metaepistemology and Skepticism (the book is available in the Reserve Section of the University Park Library, call number BD 161 F 86 1995), Richard Fumerton contends that:

 

…the epistemic concept of discrimination that Alston invokes…is precisely the concept that is at odds with his own attempt to defend an externalist understanding of epistemic concepts. 

  The fundamental objection to externalism can be easily summarized.  If we understand epistemic concepts as the externalists suggest we do, then there would be no objection in principle to using perception to justify reliance on perception, memory to justify reliance on memory, and induction to justify reliance on induction.  But there is no philosophically interesting concept of justification that would allow us to use a kind of reasoning to justify the legitimacy of using the reasoning.  Therefore the externalist has failed to analyze a philosophically interesting concept of justification of knowledge.[1] 

 

Clarify Fumerton’s criticism and critically assess it. 

 

2. In his “Circularity and Stability,” Markus Lammenranta maintains that Alston’s argument from practical rationality commits a fallacy which Alston takes others to task for:

 

the problem is that if we take this to be an external evaluation of our sources of belief, all we get are hypothetical conclusions, quite similar to those that an epistemically circular reliability argument can give us.  Namely, if sense perception…is reliable, then it is practically rational for us to assume that sense perception is reliable.  How is this better than the conclusion that if sense perception is reliable, then we are (epistemically) justified in believing that sense perception is reliable.  Alston’s shift to practical rationality offers thus no advantage compared to the arguments that are plainly circular.[2] 

 

The passage in Alston’s The Reliability of Sense Perception which I believe Lammenranta has in mind is the discussion of his discussion of “hypothetical justification:” on pp. 16-17 which, he claims, gives us stone rather than bread.  Clarify Lammenranta’s criticism and critically assess it. 

 

3. In an article on “Epistemic Circularity,” Markus Lammenranta discusses Alston’s views, those of other philosophers such as Wittgenstein, and assesses the strength of Alston’s pragmatic argument.[3]  Read Lammenranta’s essay and critically consider the criticisms he offers. 

 

4. Although they do not directly take up the work by Alston which we have read, in their “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Earl Conee and Richard Feldman offer a criticism of reliabilism as Alston conceives it (the essay is reprinted in our text on pp. 296-309).  Clarify Conee and Feldman’s criticism and critically assess its applicability to Alston’s theory. 

 

5. In his “First Things First,” Earl Conee offers an interesting critique of Alston’s discussion of epistemically circular arguments (see pp. 22-30).[4]  Clarify and critically assess the flaws they find in Alston’s discussion and discuss the implications the truth of their view would have for Alston’s theory.  The book is available in the Reserve Section of the University Park Library. 

 

6. In his review of Alston’s book in Mind [1995], Thomas Uebel offers some suggestive (but underdeveloped) criticisms.  Read he review and critically consider (and develop) the criticisms.  How telling are they against Alston’s orientation?  Uebel’s essay is available on line at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2346/is_n415_v104/ai_17340619 . 

 

7. In his “A Critique of Externalism,” Keith Lehrer offers a criticism of all forms of externalism.  Clarify what flaws he finds in these theories and critically assess how the criticisms apply to Alston’s view.  The essay is available in our text [Classical and Contemporary Readings in Epistemology (third edition), ed. Louis Pojman, on pp. 273-286. 

 

8. In her “A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification,” Susan Haack argues against pure foundationalism and coherentism and for a view which combines these orientations.  Clarify what she feels are the problems which the pure theories encounter, how well you believe her theory overcomes these problems, and what you think the prospects are for the orientation she recommends. 

 

9. In his “A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification,” David Annis argues for a theory of epistemic justification which diverges significantly from those of the foundationalists and coherentists. 

 

10. In her “Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant,” Lorraine Code contends that a feminist perspective is important in epistemology.  Clarify what she feels the importance of this perspective are, and critically assess its importance.  The essay is available in our text [Classical and Contemporary Readings in Epistemology (third edition), ed. Louis Pojman, on pp. 559-571. 

 

11. You may write a paper on any of the first paper topics which you did not write your first paper on.  For your convenience, these topics are available on the course web-site. 

 

If you wish to write on another topic, you must clear the choice with me first.  Your papers should be approximately 2000 words long (eight double-spaced typewritten pages of 250 words per page).  This indication of length is meant as a guide to the student—papers much shorter than the indicated length are unlikely to have adequately addressed one of the assigned topics.  Papers may, of course, be longer than the indicated length.  I will be happy to read rough drafts and to discuss your ideas for your papers with you provided you give them prior to 3:30 on Friday, April 10.  The papers should be typed and are due in my class on Tuesday, April 14.  I am giving you the paper topics now so that you have at least two weekends to work on the paper.  If you plan to wait till the last moment to write your paper, I recommend you review the Course Syllabus regarding penalties for late papers.  Please review my policy on extensions, late papers, and plagiarism (contained in the course syllabus).  Please also review my supplement Guide to Writing Philosophy Papers which is available on the class web-site. 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanaham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), pp. 179. 

[2] Markus Lammenranta, “Circularity and Stability,” delivered at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, August 1998.  Viewed online on 03/24/2009 at:

http://web.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoLamm.htm . 

[3] The essay is available online at: http://www.helsinki.fi/filosofia/filo/henk/Lammenranta/Epistemic%20Circularity.doc . 

[4] Earl Conee, “First Things First,” in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), pp. 11-36. 

 

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File revised on 04/02/2009