Copyright © 2006 Bruce W. Hauptli

1. Introduction:

Lehrer attacks those who claim we have knowledge (he calls them "dogmatists") and offers a theory of ignorance (he calls it an agnoiology).  He defends a radical version of scepticism according to which we do not know anything--even that no one knows anything.  His intention, clearly, is to avoid the paradoxical sort of self-refutation which would plague skeptics who contend that "there is nothing we can be justified in believing."  The issue here, which we will not be able to study in detail, is whether one can be a consistent skeptic--can one meaningfully, consistently, and practically deny that human beings have knowledge?1

     Lehrer's core argument for skepticism can be characterized as follows:

1. Knowledge is generally held to be, minimally, completely justified true belief. [57]

2. Lehrer maintains that "it is not the logical impossibility of error [e.g., infallibility] by itself that guarantees knowledge but only [our] knowledge of the logical impossibility.  If we know that it is logically impossible that certain of our beliefs are mistaken, then, no doubt, we know that these beliefs are true.  But this if is the noose that strangles dogmatism." [p. 59]

3. That is, and more generally, the "possible truth" of the "sceptical hypothesis" entails that our beliefs are not completely justified. [60]

4. Moreover, "unless we can show that the sceptical hypothesis is false, we cannot justly conclude that it is unjustified." [p. 65]

5. However, we cannot show that the sceptical hypothesis is false.

6. Therefore, we do not know anything, even that we do not know anything.

Note that there is a definite air of paradox pervading this argument: if it is a good argument (whatever that could mean for someone who adheres to Lehrer's position), then it must be, it would seem, a bad argument--or, more carefully, we can not be very confident regarding the argument, since we know so little!

     Note, also, the tremendous difference between the skeptic and Socrates.  Both would have us recognize our ignorance, but they diverge from this beginning point rather radically.  Socrates, Plato, and most other philosophers, use the recognition of our ignorance ["Socratic ignorance"] as a stage in the search for knowledge (they use it as a vehicle toward appropriately justified belief).  The skeptic, on the other hand, says that once the recognition of ignorance is at hand, our problems are over (rather than our work just having begun)!

     Lehrer does not attempt to provide, as do the ancient "Pyrrhonian" skeptics, a motivation for adopting the skeptical orientation.  In his "Classical Scepticism--A Polemical Introduction," Phillip Hallie helps us with this when he says:

scepticism thrived in the ancient world from the fourth century B.C. to the third century A.D., when practical-wisdom philosophies like Stoicism and Epicureanism were (though sporadically) important; in general, this was an era in the history of ideas when pure theoretical and pure mystical or otherworldly philosophies were the exception in the Greek world.  What interested the Greeks primarily was insight into the proper conduct of life, practical wisdom for producing a happy life...."2

...the arche, or moving cause, of Scepticism is the hope of living normally and peacefully without metaphysical dogmatism or fanaticism; and part of the means for so living is the Practical Criterion of the Sceptics.  This Criterion stated that one should follow "the guidance of nature, the compulsion of the feelings, the tradition of laws and customs, and the instruction of the arts.  The ataraxia, or unpreterbedness, that Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism sought was not a sort of paralytic anesthesia; it was peaceful living according to the institutions of one's own country and the dictates of one's own feelings, experience, and common sense.  All three philosophies wanted tranquility, not paralysis; a peaceful life, not an imitation of death."3

Lehrer's discussion really provides little motivation for becoming a skeptic over and above the core argument mentioned above--though he makes some movement in that direction at the end of the essay.

     His argument is paradoxical in a second way however: it is not so much an argument for the skeptical hypothesis, rather, it is an argument that we can not come up with an argument against it.  He doesn't claim to show that skepticism is right and dogmatism is wrong, instead, he claims that the failure of the dogmatists to show that the skeptical hypothesis is wrong shows that their claims are not completely justified.

     Thus a lot turns on what he calls the "burden of proof."  Note that it is probably not accidental that he terms his opponents "dogmatists," but calling them such does not (by itself) firmly place the burden in their court.  Thus you will have to ask yourself "Who has the burden of proof here?"

     Lehrer's procedure in the article is to address a number of arguments against skepticism in an attempt to show that since skepticism has not been shown to be false, individuals lack complete justification (although they thought they had it).  That is, (i) he tries to "show" that the skeptical hypothesis has not been shown to be false by any of the "standard philosophical moves," (ii) he tries to show that the "burden of proof" lies squarely on the shoulders of those who claim to know, and, finally, (iii) he tries to indicate that nothing is lost to our lives if we cease being dogmatists (though he does not concentrate upon this).

The Text:

2. Agnoiology:

56 Lehrer indicates that he will develop an agnoiology--a theory of ignorance.  He will consider a radical version of scepticism according to which we do not know anything--"...even that no one knows anything."

He offers what is called a "global" skepticism--it is meant to apply to all of our claims rather than to some sub-set ("local" skepticisms like skepticism regarding knowledge claims about others' mental states, the past, or regarding extra-sensory perception).  As noted above, he clearly wishes to avoid any air of paradoxical self-refutation.

"The sceptic is not prevented by his agnoiology from believing most of the same things we believe; indeed, all his position debars him from is believing in such things as would entail that we have knowledge."

3. The First Premise:

61 The first crucial premise of Lehrer's overall argument is his claim that "...if a man knows that p, then he is completely justified in believing that p....Though completely justified true belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, it is not a sufficient condition of knowledge, it is not a sufficient condition for reasons that might further the cause of scepticism."4

Lehrer argues for this claim over the next two pages or so claiming that a discussion of two sorts of cases which are generally held to be the most secure from skepticism show that complete justification is, while a necessary condition for knowledge, is not sufficient:5 individuals might be completely justified and yet not recognize that the justifications are compelling, complete, etc.  The two cases are where individuals appeal to claims which are "beyond doubt"--mathematics and first-person-singular psychological reports of one's own conscious states.

(a) Regarding Logical/Mathematical Claims: the dogmatists claim that it is logically impossible to be mistaken in believing necessary truths,6 "..it is logically impossible to be mistaken when one believes any statement which is a necessary truth no matter how speculative or groundless such a belief may be."

-58 "...if the dogmatist argues that a person knows that a statement is true whenever it is logically impossible for him to be mistaken in believing it, then he will be committed to the implausible conclusion that a person knows a mathematical statement to be true whenever he correctly believes it to be so no matter how foolish or groundless his belief.  However, this violates our assumption that a belief must be completely justified as well as true or else we lack knowledge."

 --Consider several examples:

 p (q p). 

 

 -"...we cannot assume a man knows whereof he believes simply because it is logically impossible that he should be mistaken in what he believes.  For he may have no proof or justification for believing what he does."  In short, logical truth is not sufficient for knowledge.

(b) Regarding Claims About Present Sensations: some dogmatists have contended that there are also some contingent claims about which one cannot be mistaken.  The most common candidates here are one's beliefs about one's own current psychological states--it is often claimed that they can not be erroneous.  Lehrer disagrees: "...there are almost no beliefs about one's own present states of consciousness that it is logically inconsistent to suppose should be false."

-Consider one's present sensations: one might mistake an itch for a pain--haven't you ever yelled out in "pain" when you expected a painful experience only to be embarrassed because you didn't feel a pain?

-Moreover, beliefs about sensations can be inferential, and false inferences are possible.

4. The Second Premise:

59 Consideration of these "cases" leads Lehrer to his claim that "it is not the logical impossibility of error that could yield knowledge but rather our knowledge of the logical impossibility of error. If we know that it is logically impossible that certain of our beliefs are mistaken, then, no doubt, we know that these beliefs are true.  But this if is the noose that strangles dogmatism.  For even if we agree it is logically impossible for certain contingent beliefs to be mistaken, still it does not follow that we know that it is logically impossible for these beliefs to be mistaken, and, hence it does not follow that we know that the beliefs are true."

     At this point, rather than offer any further direct argument for scepticism, Lehrer addresses several common attempts to circumvent a skeptical conclusion.

5. Regarding The Dogmatists' Claim That The Skeptic Uses `Know' Without Meaning Or With a "Different" Meaning:

There seems to be something wrong with the skeptical challenge as he is portraying it, however, and before he continues his overall argument, Lehrer considers whether the sceptics may be using the work `know'7 in a deviant manner that undercuts their conclusion.  Here he is responding to one of the traditional contemporary critiques of the sceptical orientation.  Many contemporary philosophers claim that the skeptic either uses the word `know' without meaning, or gives it a new and utterly nonstandard meaning.  These critics offer a therapy intended to bring the sceptic back to common linguistic sense or practice.  In the reading selection we have, Pojman has omitted this discussion!

Lehrer responds to such criticisms by maintaining that while it may seem as if the skeptic speaks nonsense, it is not nonsense (at least not as long as we keep in mind a distinction between the ordinary context of our humdrum affairs and the extra-ordinary context of our intellectual concerns): "we do understand what the sceptic says precisely because we can tell that he has denied what we have affirmed.  No matter how hard one tries not to understand, one cannot fail to understand that much.  Thus, because you understand what you affirm, you must understand what the sceptic denies.  You might still think the sceptic is talking nonsense--but it is meaningful.  Even a dogmatist must concede that the skeptic speaks meaningful nonsense."

He also notes that "we can easily explain why the sceptic uses the word `know' as he does without supposing that he means something different by the term.  The way in which he uses the term is most readily and simply explained by supposing that he believes something different from the rest of us."

6. Regarding the Dogmatists' Appeal to Basic Beliefs,  The Sceptical Hypothesis, and the Third Premise:

A different sort of criticism of skepticism is offered by philosophers who take the path marked out by Thomas Reid [1710-1796] (as well as by Roderick Chisholm and G.E. Moore).8  These philosophers contend that we have certain "basic beliefs" which are justified but which require no supporting justificatory argument--merely believing them constitutes believing them with complete justification.  Lehrer points out that different philosophers specify different epistemic bases (perceptual belief, memory belief, beliefs concerning our conscious states).

63 Whatever basic set of beliefs one specifies, however, Lehrer asks us to consider what he calls "the sceptical hypothesis."*9   His version of this hypothesis posits a distant race of Googols (whose intellectual capacity is 10¹⁰⁰ of ours) who employ their artifice to mislead us regarding our basic beliefs.

64 -Lehrer calls the Googol speculation a sceptical hypothesis,* and claims that to justifiably claim to know in the case of the basic beliefs we must show that the sceptical hypothesis (generically speaking) is false.

7. Regarding the Question of The Burden of Proof, and the Fourth Premise:

60 "The reply of the dogmatist to such imaginings might be that we are not only justified in those basic beliefs, we are also justified in rejecting any hypothesis,* such as the sceptical [Googol] one, which conflict* with those beliefs....Dogmatists affirm that the beliefs of common sense are innocent until proven guilty, but why, the sceptic might inquire, should his hypothesis* not receive comparable treatment before the bar of evidence?"

-The question here is one of location of the burden of proof.  "...such questions are best left to courts of law where they have suitable application.  In philosophy a different principle of agnoiology is appropriate, to wit that no hypothesis should be rejected as unjustified without argument against it."

--Philosophical aside: of course, the "dogmatists" (or, at least, those are proponents of "basic beliefs") would, or should, reject this principle!

-60 "...if a belief is completely justified, then those* with which it conflicts are unjustified.  Therefore, if neither of the conflicting hypotheses* is shown to be unjustified, then we must refrain from concluding that belief in one of the hypotheses is completely justified.
  We have here an argument that does not prejudicially presuppose that the burden of proof rests on one side or the other but instead takes an impartial view of the matter and refuses to side with either party until some argument has been given.  Thomas Reid was wont to argue that the beliefs of common sense had a right of ancient possession and were justified until shown to be unjustified.  But such epistemology favors the sentiments of conservative defenders of the status quo in both philosophy and politics.  And the principle that, what is, is justified, is not a better principle of epistemology than of politics or morals.  It should be supplanted by the agnoiological principle of impartiality.  Thus, before scepticism may be rejected as unjustified, some argument must be given to show that the infamous hypotheses employed by sceptics  are incorrect and the beliefs of common sense have the truth on their side."

--Philosophical Aside: this discussion seems reasonable as long as we are discussing several "reasonable competing hypotheses."  But does the "skeptical hypothesis" fit into such a category?  In addition, of course, the talk of "conflicting hypotheses" supposes, does it not, some knowledge of factors relevant to which the hypotheses can be said to be competitive?  Can the skeptic allow for such presumptive knowledge?  Moreover, and finally, can someone who adheres to Lehrer's final thesis assert what he asserts in these passages?

61 Lehrer recognizes that one common response to this sort of skeptical argument consists of claiming that the skeptics would have us deny our standards of evidence or our criteria of justification.  He replies that "...obviously the sceptic is denying that we are completely justified in certain beliefs which we consider to be completely justified....But that is no argument against the sceptic; it is a restatement of his position.  Unless we can show that the sceptical hypothesis* is false, we cannot justly conclude that it is unjustified."

Another version of this response to the sceptical argument is that the sceptic is undermining our conceptual framework--the claim is that the sceptic is trying to change the very concepts we use to formulate our beliefs.  But, Lehrer contends, the only change the sceptic is specifying is that we stop claiming to know.  We may still believe the various "basic" beliefs!

As he says, "...appeals to ancient rights, standards of evidence, and conceptual frameworks are all equally ineffective against the basic challenge of scepticism, to wit--either show that the sceptical hypothesis is false and unjustified or concede that beliefs inconsistent with that hypothesis are not completely justified."

8. Regarding Appeals to "Alternative Epistemic Ends:"

The final sort of response to the skeptical challenge which Lehrer considers is the response which identifies alternative epistemological ends.  Some philosophers maintain that instead of truth we are interested in facilitating explanation or increasing information, and that we may be able to by-pass the skeptical challenge: "if a person is seeking to have beliefs which facilitate explanation and increase information, then he is completely justified in adopting beliefs contributing to these objectives.  This argument against scepticism is, I believe, the very strongest that can be offered.  For, even if we can offer no argument to show that our beliefs are true and the sceptical hypothesis false, we still may be completely justified in our beliefs in terms of objectives other than truth."

Lehrer notes, however, that "all in all the sceptical hypothesis is quite unsatisfactory from the standpoint of explaining things and increasing our information; so unsatisfactory that anyone seeking to explain as much as possible and to increase his information as much as possible would be completely justified in rejecting it."

However, the sceptic might reject these alternative epistemic ends.

61-62 Moreover, and more importantly, the skeptic should also note that "...our disregard for truth will, in the final accounting, destroy our assets.  For agnoiology shows that such pragmatic justification of belief ultimately depends on the assumption that the beliefs are true.  Suppose we adopt those beliefs that are most full of explanatory power and informative content, and those admirable beliefs turn out to be false.  In that case, by adopting those beliefs we shall have correctly explained nothing and increased our genuine information not at all.  For any belief to correctly explain or genuinely inform it must first be true."

62 To meet the agnoiological challenge of scepticism, we must provide some argument to show that the sceptical hypothesis is false and that the beliefs of common sense are correct.  And this leads to a second equally inescapable conclusion.  The challenge cannot be met.  Many reasons may be given for not believing the sceptical hypothesis.  Indeed, a sceptic himself need not believe the sceptical hypothesis, and he might agree that there are practical disadvantages in believing such a hypothesis.  But he might justifiably insist that we are not completely justified in concluding that the hypothesis is false.

 Lehrer contends, however, that we need not morn the passing of knowledge.  We may speak of rational belief without speaking of knowledge:

63 "We can...regard practical action and scientific inquiry as aiming at the satisfaction of objectives appropriate to each sphere.  We change our beliefs to better satisfy those objectives.  Thus, we may, while remaining sceptics, contend that our beliefs and actions are rational even though we agree that such beliefs are not so completely justified as to constitute knowledge.  As such, all beliefs, even those we consider rational, are subject to critical review.  None can be exempted from evaluation on the grounds that it is known to be true without need of supporting argument."

10. Some Criticisms of Lehrer's "Why Not Scepticism?":

1. A criticism of Lehrer's skeptical argument:

(A) He assumes his "principle of philosophical argumentation" which requires that no hypothesis should be rejected as unjustified without an argument against it. [p. 60]

(B) He argues against the "basic belief" (or "common sense") theorists, like Chisholm, Moore, and Reid, who maintain that our basic beliefs are secure cases of knowledge, by asserting that if they are to hold to their views, they must have an argument against the skeptical hypothesis.

(C) He maintains that there is no successful argument against the skeptical hypothesis.

(D) Therefore, he claims, we don't know the things the "dogmatists" claim we know.

But, by (A), to show (D) (that is, that the dogmatists are wrong), he must do more than assert and assume (B) and (C)--he must offer an argument against the dogmatists (for (D)).  But since (A)-(D) is his argument, (A), (B), and (C) must be "positive claims" on his part.  The only other alternative is that they are claims of the dogmatists which he appeals to in a "reductio" argument, and, clearly, (A), (B), and (C) don't have this status!  But if this is the case then he can't hold to his ultimate position--there are some things he "knows" (e.g., (A), (B), and (C)).

(E) Imagine an "anti-sceptical hypothesis" which holds that there are "Googolplexs" who ensure that valid epistemic beliefs are held by us--that is, they mislead the Googols and ensure that we have JTB, (etc.).

(F) This hypothesis, by Lehrer's "principle of philosophic argumentation" ((A) above) must be shown to be flawed if it is to be dismissed.  But (following (B) and (C) above), if there is no argument against the "Googolplex hypothesis," then we must "suspend judgment" vis-a-vis both it and Lehrer's "sceptical hypothesis"--that is we cannot assert his sceptical hypothesis.

(G). Thus, his "sceptical hypothesis" cannot come into play against the dogmatists' "basic beliefs" in the way he imagines.

3. In his An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Matthias Steup maintains that:

...the skeptic set out to show that we don't know what we ordinarily think we know.  But if this is what he wishes to accomplish, he must demonstrate that we don't have empirical knowledge in the ordinary sense of "knowledge"....[however, he] can only demonstrate that we don't have empirical knowledge in the revised sense [which requires "complete justification"].  But if this is what he establishes, then he does not meet the objective he set out to meet.  And in that case, the nonskeptic can respond: "Well, what you have established is that if knowledge requires infallible justification, then we don't know what we ordinarily think we know.  And with that I agree.  However, that's not much of a concession on my part, for I never claimed that we have empirical knowledge if that is what we mean by `knowledge.'  Rather, what I claimed all along is that we have empirical knowledge given our ordinary understanding of that concept.  And certainly you haven't shown me that that claim is false.10

4. See Dan Turner's "Why Scepticism?"11

5. In his “Relevant Alternatives,” Stewart Cohen  discusses how the “relevant alternatives theory” tries to resolve the apparent tension between holding that knowledge is an “absolute concept” and holding that we have knowledge:

according to the theory, we need to qualify rather than deny the absolute character of knowledge.  We should view knowledge as absolute, relative to a certain standard.  That is to say, in order to know a proposition, our evidence need not eliminate all the alternatives to that proposition.  Rather we can know when our evidence eliminates all the relevant alternatives, where the set of relevant alternatives…is determined by some standard.  Moreover, according to the relevant alternatives view, the standards determined that the alternatives raised by the sceptic are not relevant.12 

Notes:

0 Cf., Keith Lehrer, "Why Not Scepticism?" The Philosophical Forum v. 2 (1971), pp. 289-298.  The essay is reprinted in The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings (third edition), ed. Louis Pojman (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2003), pp. 56-63.   Back

1 Cf., Myles Burnyeat, "Can The Skeptic Live His Skepticism?" in his The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley: University of California, 1983), pp. 117-148.  This essay has engendered a scholarly sub-industry on the topic, but it the place to start in thinking about the issue of the consistency of skepticism.  Many of these articles are reprinted in The Original Sceptics, eds. Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996).   Back

2 Phillip Hallie, "Classical Scepticism--A Polemical Introduction," in his Sextus Empiricus: Selections from the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man, and God, trans. Sanford Etheridge (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), pp. 2-28, p. 6.   Back

3 Ibid., p. 7.  Emphasis added to passage.  Back

4 Emphasis added to the passage.  Note: `p' stands proxy for any proposition (any assertion or denial).   Not all sentences are propositions (questions and commands, for example, don't make assertions).   Back

5 The distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions may be made in a number of ways.  Necessary conditions may be described as "those which must be there for an event to occur" (thus paying your parking fines is necessary for graduation), while sufficient conditions are conditions such that the event must occur (thus a direct double shotgun blast to the head is sufficient  for death).  Note that conditions may be sufficient without being necessary (as in the example), and that necessary conditions need not be sufficient (as in the example).  An alternate way of drawing the distinction is to say that "p is  a necessary  condition for q" means "if q is true, then p is  true" (symbolically q -> p), while "p is a sufficient condition for  q" means "if p is true, then q is true" (symbolically: p -> q).  Back

6 Necessary truths are held to be those whose denials express contradictions.  Thus, "squares have four sides" is considered a necessary truth (since its denial expresses a contradiction).  Such truths are contrasted with contingent truths--those whose denials do not express contradictions.   For example,  "Bruce Hauptli exists" is contingently true--while it is true, things could have been (and, alas, eventually will be) otherwise. Back

7 Philosophers use single quotes (`') to indicate situations where they are speaking about, or mentioning, a word rather than using it.  For example in the sentence "The word `short' is not a  long word.", `short' is mentioned while `long' is used.  In the sentence about the example sentence (that is, the previous  one), both are mentioned!   Back

8 Cf., Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid (London: Routledge, 1989), and the lecture supplement on  Chisholm's "The Problem of the Criterion."   Back

(9) We are going to have to be careful, or, at least, critically consider, Lehrer's use of `hypotheses' in the argument here and in the next section.  The annotation mark here (*), and below, indicates the spots we must examine critically. Back

10 Matthias Steup, An Introduction to Contemporary  Epistemology (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996), pp. 215-216; emphasis added to the passage.  Back

11  Cf., Dan Turner, "Why Scepticism?" in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, eds. George Pappas and Marshall Swain (Ithaca: Cornell U.P.: 1978), pp. 364-369.  This book is on reserve in the Library.  Back  

12 Stewart Cohen, “Relevant Alternatives,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 430-433, p. 431.  Back

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