Copyright © 2007 Bruce W. Hauptli

1. The Periods in the History of Philosophy:

This course deals with the period from 1590 (the birth of Descartes to 1716 (the death of Leibniz).  This period constitutes one-half of the period usually referred to as "Early Modern Philosophy"—that dealing with the "Continental Rationalists" (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz). The second half of this period—which covers what is called "British Empiricism" (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume)—will be offered in a subsequent semester.

The first question you may have in this course is "What does the `early modern' in `Early Modern Philosophy' mean?"  The dividing of our history or culture into "periods" is, of course, arbitrary and subject to (much) disagreement.  Nevertheless, I believe the following "rough-and-ready" classification is widely adhered to in the histories of Western philosophy:

the Pre-Philosophical Period (prior to 600 B.C.E.).  According to C.M. Bowra, in their "Archaic Period" the Greeks expressed their most significant speculations in poetry, and even when this was reinforced by sculpture and painting, their outlook was still largely shaped by their poetical education and the principles which it implied.  Even if the traditional myths left much unexplained, and even contradicted each other on important matters, they provided an approach to experience, a way of thinking in concrete images, which satisfied a people who had no reason to doubt that the gods were at work everywhere and that a knowledge of them explained most phenomena, both physical and mental.1  

the Ancient Period (600 B.C.E.-200 B.C.E.),

the Roman Period (200 B.C.E.-400 A.D.),

the Medieval Period (400-1400),2 and

the Renaissance Period (1400-1600):

-the beginning marks of this transition period are found in literature (Petrarch 1304-1374), painting (Giotto), the discovery of old manuscripts in history, and in science (Galileo).  Castiglione's The Courtier3 (1528) is also significant.  In his "Renaissance," N. Gilbert maintains that "...the humanists were the heirs of a less ambitious but old and respectable Medieval profession, that of the dictatore or teacher of the art of letter-writing (ars dictaminis).  The Renaissance teachers of "humanities" placed a greater emphasis on ancient models than had the dictatores, but their teaching had much the same objective.  Their students often became official letter writers or speech-makers for the popes and princes."4  

-Stephen Toulmin notes that the Renaissance humanists were not anti-religious: "Erasmus wrote an essay, In Praise of Folly, which ridiculed dogmatism; yet he combined his loyalty to the traditional Church with being one of Martin Luther's most valued correspondents.  Nothing would have pleased him more than to persuade his German friend not to press reforming zeal to the point of no return....Michel de Montaigne, who was a child when Erasmus died in the 1530s, criticized claims to theological certainty in a similar vein, as being presumptuous and dogmatic. Yet he too saw himself as being a good Catholic and, on a visit to Rome, felt entitled to ask for an audience with the Pope."5 

-Toulmin goes on to note that "like the two classical philosophers to whom Montaigne compares himself, Pyrrho and Sextus, the humanists saw philosophical questions as reaching beyond the scope of experience in an indefeasible way.  Faced with abstract, universal, timeless theoretical propositions, they saw no sufficient basis in experience, either for asserting or for denying them."6 

-This period includes the Reformation (16^th Century—1517: Luther's 95 Theses (the three essential Protestant Doctrines were: authority of the word, justification by faith alone, and the priesthood of all believers). This period includes the Protestant Reformation (Luther, Calvin, and others), the Radical Reformation (including Anabaptists [biblical literalists and spiritualists who had direct conversations with the deity—the Protestants were generally not too sympathetic with this orientation], Anglican Reformers (Henry VIII, Elizabeth I—her 39 articles of religion [Latin: 1563, English: 1571], were the official standard of the Reformed Church of England), and, perhaps, the Catholic Reformers (establishment of the Jesuit Order, for example).  However these latter reformers may better fit into the category of the Counter-Reformation.

-In addition, this period marks the beginning of the development of modern science, the "discovery" (and appropriation) of the "new" world, and the development of the modern nation state.

the Modern Period (1500-1800), about which, of course, we will have much more to say in this course, and

some would maintain that there are periods after the Modern one, but I will leave this issue largely untouched.  According to some, the Modern period extends through the individuals we will study through the British Empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), and (in a period sometimes referred to as "Late Modern Philosophy") beyond to Kant (1724-1804), Hegel (1779-1831), Comte (1789-1857), Mill (1806-1873), Darwin (1809-1882), Kierkegaard (1813-1885), Marx (1818-1883), Nietzsche (1844-1900), and into the contemporary period.  Some contend, however, that we live in the Post-Modern period.  As I said, this is another story—and any understanding of what post-modernism "is" would require some understanding of modernism anyway. 

To understand the Early Modern Period, we need a bit of historical background.  In his "The Recovery of Practical Philosophy," Stephen Toulmin provides an excellent "introduction" to "Modern" Philosophy.  In making his point regarding the turmoil which arose in the late 16^th and early 17^th centuries (especially from 1610-1650), he makes a wonderful appeal to John Donne's (1572-1631) "An Anatomy of the World" (1611) citing especially these lines of the poem:

And new Philosophy calls all in doubt,
The Element of fire is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit
Can well direct him where to looke for it....
'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerance gone;
All just supply, and all Relation:
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
For every man alone thinkes he hath got
To be a Phoenix, and that there can bee
None of that kind, of which he is, but hee.7

In short, this world view offered a teleological conception of the universe where value and fact infused one another.8a    Michael Matthews maintains that:

central to Aristotle's thought is his concept of nature. This was essentialistic and teleological.  Nature was not just matter moving around as a result of random pushes and pulls (materialism), nor was it an unintelligible and imperfect shadow of some other perfect realm (Platonism).  Nature was differentiated into various species and objects, all of them had their own internal and essential dynamic for change (including local motion).  Their alteration was the progressive, teleological actualization of a preexisting potential.  The universe was finite, closed, hierarchically ordered, and all its constituents were fixed. Everything had its own preordained purpose.

In appropriate circumstances, the acorn would develop through an internally generated process of natural change.  Likewise, when not interfered with, heavy objects would naturally move to their natural place at the centre of the earth.  Science was largely concerned with the understanding of these natural changes in the world.  The contrasting violent or chance changes were of little interest to philosophers, as they did not reveal anything of the object's nature.9 

the material cause—what a thing is made of,

the formal cause—how a thing is structured,

the efficient cause—what brings a thing about, and

the final cause—the goal/purpose of a thing. 

While a full understanding of anything requires that we understand all four causes, the final cause is the most important one—Aristotle offers a teleological view!  Not everything lives up to its final cause however—consider two acorns which have the same internal character but are grown in very different environments.  Thus the talk of the other causes becomes quite important for him.  Talk of these other causes requires that we recognize that a thing may be judged against either an absolute standard (in terms of consideration only of the final cause) or against a more relativistic standard (which considers all the causes). 

As Basil Willey points out, this conception of nature lead to views of science and motion which are unfamiliar to us today:

St. Thomas, following Aristotle, treats motion as a branch of metaphysics; he is interested in why it happens, not how.  He discusses it in terms of `act' and `potency', quoting Aristotle's definition of it as `the act of that which is in potentiality, as such.'  Motion exists, then because things in a state of potentiality seek to actualize themselves, or because they seek the place or direction which is proper to them....To every body in respect of its `form', is `due' a `proper place', towards which it tends to move in a straight line.10 

It is unnecessary to controvert theories of this kind as if they were `untrue'.  Their `truth' is not of the empirical kind; it consists in their being consistent with a certain world-view.11 

Galileo typifies the direction of modern interests, in this instance, not in refuting St. Thomas, but in taking no notice of him.  Motion might be all that the angelic doctor had declared it to be; Galileo nevertheless will drop weights from the top of a tower, and down inclined planes, to see how they behave.  It is undeniable that the scholastic theory of motion informs us nothing of the manner in which bodies move in space and time, and this was precisely what Galileo wished to determine.  He is concerned with quantities, not qualities; and his energy is thus devoted not to framing theories consistent with a rational scheme, but to measuring the speed of falling bodies in terms of time and space.12 

In the scholastic doctrine of the heavenly bodies we have an illustration of the strange fact that a belief can be metaphysically `true' (in the sense of `coherent' or `consistent') and yet empirically false, that is, not in correspondence with what we call a `state of affairs'.  The received scholastic doctrine, for instance, taught that the heavenly bodies are unalterable and incorruptible.  This belief seems to have rested on the assumption (fact, as it then appeared) that the motions of the heavenly bodies were circular.13 

Thus the metaphysical theory of the heavens is confronted by comets, new stars, and sun-spots seen through the telescope; and Salviatus, speaking for Galileo himself, makes much of an alleged saying of Aristotle that we ought to prefer sense-evidence to logic.14 

Galileo admitted that he knew nothing about the ultimate nature of the forces he was measuring; nothing about the cause of gravitation, or the origin of the Universe; he deemed it better, rather than to speculate on such high matters, `to pronounce that wise, ingenious and modest sentence, "I know it not"'.15 

The Medieval "Great Chain Of Being" world-view came unglued for a variety of reasons.  A discussion of this transition must consider all of the following: the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the discovery (and exploitation) of the "new world," and the rise of the nation-state:

(A) The Renaissance:

(i) Humanism:

looking back to golden ages for new picture of our nature and our place in nature.  A change in focus: individuals not institutions, and writing in the vernacular.  The Greeks and Romans are seen to have had for many centuries high civilizations not founded upon Christianity or revelation. 

(ii) New science:

Its successes are directly proportional to its abstraction from value and the human—it is physics, optics, and astronomy which advance (not psychology).  Medieval science stated with propositions of the highest generality and, treating them as incontestable, proceeded to draw out their consequences.  Combustion was explained in Aristotelian terms by Medieval science—form, matter, and potential!  Epicycles and the movement of the planets and stars—forcing data to fit into a preconceived plan or pattern.  An example of the "new" orientation in science is provided by Galileo in his "Letters on Sunspots."  In a Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1615) he says:

this being granted, I think that in discussion of physical problems we ought to begin not from the authority of scriptural passages, but from sense-experiences and necessary demonstrations; for the holy Bible and the phenomena of nature proceed alike from the divine Word, the former as the dictate of the Holy Ghost and the latter as the observant executrix of God's commands.  It is necessary for the Bible, in order to be accommodated to the understanding of every man, to speak many things which appear to differ from the absolute truth so far as the bare meaning of the words is concerned.  But Nature, on the other hand, is inexorable and immutable; she never transgresses the laws imposed upon her, or cares a whit whether her abstruse reasons and methods of operation are understandable to men.16 

The success of the new science led to the sort of distinction between the realm of fact and that of value which is part of the17 Modern world-view.  The Medievals did not draw, or (certainly didn't draw in the same way) such a distinction.  Their teleological conception of the world had values and facts intimately intertwined and for the Medieval individual it was perfectly clear what was valuable and what was morally obligatory.  The success of the new science seemed, to be directly proportional to the extent that it abstracted from the value areas however.  Thus we seemed to have an increasingly adequate picture of the natural universe which left no room for values, desires, goals, or religion.  The Newtonian model was materialistic though only individuals like Hobbes were willing to make this the whole story. 

Here a metaphysical dualism arose—the universe was divided into the physical and the mental so that values, desires, and hopes seemed to go on one side while planets and bodies went on the other.  Of course, this bifurcation has important ramifications today.  Whatever its other consequences, however, this dualistic orientation allowed for the advancement of physical science without the loss of religion and humanism.  The "philosophical" problem came in the attempt to marry the two realms of fact and value so as to offer a unified view of ourselves and our world.  The problems here included:

how do the different "sectors" (mind and body) interact?

is one (the mental or the physical) primary?

is there a fundamental unity which undergirds this metaphysical diversity?

how can freedom and determinism coexist?

In speaking of the "Renaissance" as we discuss the differences between the Medieval and Modern world-views, we are speaking of changes in worldly concerns, while in speaking of the "Reformation" we speak of a new, more individualistic conception of the other-worldly concerns—for the Modern's it is individuals rather than institutions which are important.  The abuses of the Church (the selling of indulgences, good and bad popes, three popes, etc.) lead some to emphasize individual conscience rather than institutional dogma—the Reformation would allow each individual to interpret the Bible.  The Church becomes a rock on which people stumble as well as the rock of certainty.  Of course, the Counter-Reformation, also occurs.  It constitutes the attempt to reassert the authority of the Church. In the mid-1500s, for example, Spain marches against the Low Countries to bring them "the virtues of the Spanish Inquisition"—to free them from Protestantism! 

(C) The Discovery and Exploitation of the New World:

The discovery (and exploitation) of the "new world" is another important point to be noted in discussing the differences between the Medieval and Modern world-views.  The economic and social effects of this "discovery" (and exploitation) are tremendous—there is now somewhere for individuals to "go" (they are no longer rigidly bound to their place and station).  Moreover, it is a place of new opportunities, challenges, and riches and it offers individuals an opportunity to break out of the old molds.  It provides a "use" for the new science—navigation, use of physics to direct the engines of war, etc. It fosters a new confidence in the individual abilities of people.  Europe begins to face West rather than East! 

(D) The Rise of the Nation-State:

The rise of the nation-state provides a new kind of authority and a move away from the old order.  The rise of money-power which replaces guilds and, to some extent nobility. Credit and investment become more common.

4. Skepticism:

While all the above did not happen all at once, the combination of phenomena had an immense effect—one which we still feel today.  What is the cumulative effect?  I would sum it up as follows: insecurity, a desire for authority, and a faith in individual abilities which somehow had to be rendered compatible with a recognition of our fallibility. 

In short, the stability, security, and certainty of the Medieval period was lost.  This is the lament which is contained in the poetic reference earlier from John Donne.  The rediscovery of Greek skeptical texts facilitated the development of modern skepticism.  The Greek skeptics began with the ordinary distinction between knowledge and belief, and questioned whether we can offer any evidence which would lift claims which go beyond immediate experience from the latter category to the former one.  They recommended a "suspension of belief"—if we were really without justification for our knowledge claims, we should not make them.  Of course, the problem of justifying a standard of knowledge, of reality, or of morality did not arise as long as there was an unchallenged criterion.  But in an age of intellectual revolution, of course, this was just the problem. 

Michel de Montaigne [1533-1592] provides one example of a "modern" skeptic.  His The Apology for Raimond Sebond18 is instructive as a beginning point for our reading of Descartes (since Montaigne is one of the skeptics Descartes is reacting to):

What can man know unaided?19 

The skeptic would suspend judgment where there is no certainty. 

The difficulty in explaining and stating the skeptics' view. 

There can be no first principles nor certainty other than faith or revelation. 

We each experience things differently (wine for the sick and for the healthy). 

We get our knowledge through the senses, but:

-How do we know we have all the senses;

-Our senses are uncertain and libel to error;

-Dreaming argument; and

-Our mental and physical condition affects sensing thus raising the questions of error and subjectivity.

What of reason?

-each reason must be supported by another and this leads to a vicious infinite regress. 

Studies of the Early modern period generally divide the major thinkers into three camps: rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz), irrationalists (Pascal), and empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume). 

While we are used to relying upon sensory experience as we acquire knowledge, the rationalists instead rely upon intellectual perception.  That is, they rely upon certain truths of reason.  As is the case in geometry and logic, these truths are known intellectually and not via the senses.  While today many hold that tautologies merely tell us about the use of words, the rationalists did not hold to anything like this.  They held that there are necessary facts and these provide the indisputable account and explanation of the basic workings of the universe. 

Note: the rationalists' deductive methodology presumes there is a correspondence between logical implication and causation! 

In the broadest sense, rationalists (as opposed to the empiricists) had a "faith" in a priori deductive reason. 

Geometry and Certainty. 

In order to have certainty, it was necessary that the beginning points of a deductive argument be beyond question.  This is the function of Descartes' "natural light."  In general such philosophers believed in self-evident truths. 

Innate ideas: provide human reasoning with its beginning points.

Ex nihilo, nihil fit (from nothing, nothing comes). 

As John Nelson notes, "..certain conceptions of universal principles and/or non-sensory objects are innate, in the sense of being either images present in the mind at or before birth or inborn dispositions of the mind to form conceptions under certain circumstances. Since these conceptions, taken as either images or dispositions, exist chronologically before sensory experience, they are a priori in the literal, temporal sense of the term. Since they are not composed from or testable in sensory experience, but since they provide the basis for all scientific knowledge, they are also a priori in the logical and epistemological sense.20 

Notes:

1 C.M. Bowra, The Greek Experience (N.Y.: Mentor, 1957), p. 177.  Back

2 This includes the Medieval Renaissance (1100-1300): where there was translation of Greek texts (Euclid, Ptolemy, Aristotle); study of Aristotle's methods of observation, experiment, and logical reasoning; and work to reconcile faith and the new forms of reasoning.  Aquinas (1226-1274) was especially concerned with the latter.  William of Ockham (1300-1349) denied Aquinas' project because religious claims must be taken only on faith—he rejected Medieval metaphysics and contended that non-revealed claims must be based on experience.  Back

3 One of the most influential manners books ever written.  Here rude military virtues of the soldiers' camp and castle gave way to the graces of the "civilized" court.  Back

4 N. Gilbert, "Renaissance," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy v.7, ed. Paul Edwards (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1967), p. 176. Back

5 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1990), p. 25.  Back

6 Ibid., p. 29.   Back

7 Cited by Toulmin on pp. 341-342 of his "The Recovery of Practical Philosophy," The American Scholar v. 57 (1988), pp. 337-352.  Back

8 Cf., Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1936).  Back

8a Teleological explanations occur when past and present events are explained in terms of future events (they are “goal-oriented” explanations).  They are often contrasted with mechanical explanations which hold that present and future events are to be explained in terms of past mechanical events and their consequences.  The contrast is well-stated by Wilber Long in his entry under “teleology” in Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert Runes (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1960), p. 315.  Back8a

9 Michael Matthews, The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 6—emphasis is mine.  Back

10 Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background (New York: Columbia U.P., 1967), p. 16.  Back

11 Ibid., p. 17.  Back

12 Ibid.  Back

13 Ibid., p. 18    Back

14 Ibid., p. 20.  Back

15 Ibid., p. 21.  Back

16 Galileo Galilei, "Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina" [1615], trans. Stillman Drake, in The Philosophy of the 16^th and 17^th Centuries, ed. Richard H. Popkin (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 62.  Back

17 I would say "our" world-view here, since the Modern view is, I believe, largely ours.  But some say we live in a "post-Modern" era.  Discussing this, however, would make this introductory story far too long.  Back

18 Cf., Michel de Montaigne, The Apology for Raimond Sebond, trans. Donald Frame, in The Complete Works of Montaigne, trans. Donald Frame (Palo Alto: Stanford U.P., 1958).  Back

19 Note that Montaigne's text makes it clear that if we do receive divine "assistance," we can achieve knowledge.  Back

20 John Nelson, "Innate Ideas," Encyclopedia of Philosophy v. 4, op. cit., p. 197.  Back  

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File revised on 09/09/2007.