Copyright © 2007 Bruce W. Hauptli
Aretaic (from the Greek `arete’) theories of morality deal with excellence or virtue. Their central question is:
"What sort of person should I become?"Louis Pojman maintains that:-Rather than "What should I do?"
rather than viewing the heart of ethics to be in actions or duties, virtue-based ethical systems center in the heart of the agent—in the character and dispositions of persons. Whereas action-oriented ethics emphasize doing, virtue- or agent-based ethics emphasize being—being a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or nonactions."1To fully understand the virtue ethicists' orientation, we need to understand what they are doing that is different from those who offer an ethics of doing. The following citation from Bernard Mayo may help:
...according to the philosophy of moral character, there is another way of answering the fundamental question "What ought I to do?" Instead of quoting a rule, we quote a quality of character, a virtue: we say "Be brave," or Be patient" or "Be lenient." We may even say "Be a man"; if I am in doubt, say, whether to take a risk and someone says "Be a man," meaning a morally sound man, in this case a man of sufficient courage.2In discussing this orientation, however, we need to note that a person's character is not simply a list of traits or dispositions. As Mayo notes,
a person's character is not merely a list of dispositions; it has the organic unity of something that is more than the sum of its parts.3A particular example of what it means to "quote character" may be helpful. While Aristotle's ethical discussion is full of examples of "means" between "extremes," we might start with a more standard example: that of Socrates in Plato's Crito.
Discuss why Socrates does not escape in the Crito, why he refuses to obey a law not to philosophize in the Apology, what he "cares" about, and what would be harmed if he did escape. In discussing this make it clear that the concept of the soul here is not "our" concept, and that the concept of justice here is not "our" concept.(end)
Notes:
1 Louis Pojman, "Virtue-Based Ethical Systems," in Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (fifth edition), ed. Louis Pojman (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2007), pp. 371-374, p. 371. Back
2 Bernard Mayo, "Virtue and the Moral Life," in Ethical Theory, op. cit., pp. 400-402, p. 401. The selection originally appeared in Mayo's Ethics and the Moral Life (London: Macmillan, 1958). Back
3 Ibid., p. 402. Back
File last revised on: 04/11/2007.