Copyright © 2009 Bruce W. Hauptli
There are so many critiques of Anselm's argument that we could not begin to discuss them all without spending the rest of the semester on this topic. In what follows I highlight some criticisms which point to central difficulties with the argument. I will orient these critiques around my "eight step" analysis of the argument (though this does not necessarily lead to a list of the critiques in terms of their degree of importance).
(A) In regard to the First Step:
If one doesn't accept Anselm's "definition," the proof of course falls apart. O.K. Bouwsma maintains that Anselm misinterprets the passage in the Psalms from which he derives the definition:1 "the notion of "greatest" as used [in that context] in praise rather than as a description. Thus there is a linguistic error in confusing language of praise with language of description."2 That is, Bouwsma contends that the Psalms Anselm refers to praise the transcendent being rather than describe it, and, he contends, it is a linguistic error to interpret praise as a definition.
In his "The Search for Certainty," Hans Reichenbach offers a different sort of critique of the first step when he maintains that:
the premise, in fact, is analytic, because every definition is.3 Since the statement of God's existence is synthetic,4 the inference represents a trick by which a synthetic conclusion is derived from an analytic premise.Of course we need to recognize that Anselm himself would draw our attention to the fact that he begins “in faith,” and thus he has not doubt that his “definition” is solidly and objectively based, it is nonetheless true that a “necessary truth” may merely be a truth about definitions, concepts, etc., and thus it tells us nothing about existence (let alone telling us anything about “necessary existence”).
The fallacious nature of this inference is easily seen from its absurd consequences. If it is permissible to derive existence from a definition, we could demonstrate the existence of a cat with three tails by defining such an animal as a cat which has three tails and which exists. Logically speaking, the fallacy consists in a confusion of universals with particulars. From the definition we can only infer that universal statement that if something is a cat with three tails it exists, which is a true statement. But the particular statement that there is a cat with three tails cannot be derived. Similarly, we can infer from Anselm's definition only the statement that if something is an infinitely perfect being it exists, but not that there is such a being.5
(B) In regard to the Fifth and Sixth Steps:
Remember the chart I have offered which distinguishes "things" into four categories: "necessary things," "contingent and actual things," "contingent and possible things," and "necessarily nonexistent things." When I introduced the argument and gave it my "eight step analysis," I indicated that when "the fool" maintains that the deity exists only in the understanding, he or she is saying that it does not reside in either of the first two categories (which both are "in reality" in Anselm's categorization of these things). This leaves two possibilities: the fool could be saying that this deity is a "possible but not actual" thing, or that this deity is an "impossible" thing. Now clearly Anselm's argument presumes the former--if his concept of a deity belongs in the fourth category (that is, is an "impossible thing," like round squares, or married bachelors), then it can not exist, and the proof is clearly flawed.
If you are still with me on this point, we can say that Anselm's argument presumes (in my eight step version, the presumption is in the fifth and sixth steps) that his deity is a "possible thing." He doesn't "prove" that this is the case however. William Rowe questions whether God is "a possible thing:"
...the positive integer than which none larger is possible is an impossible object. Perhaps this is also true of the being than which none greater is possible. That is, perhaps no matter how great a being may be, it is possible for there to be a being greater than it. If this were so, then, like the integer than which none larger is possible, Anselm's God would not be a possible object. The mere fact that there are degrees of greatness, however, does not entitle us to conclude that Anselm's God is like the integer than which none larger is possible. There are, for example, degrees in the size of angles--one angle is larger than another--but it is not true that no matter how large an angle is it is possible for there to be an angle greater than it." The question is, is God like the integer or like the angle.6
(c) Regarding the Sixth Step:
In this step Anselm assumes that "existence in reality" is greater than "existence in the understanding." First, of course, he doesn't prove that this is the case. That is, his argument needs to provide some support for this claim. Secondly, however, one could contend that this is only "relatively" true, rather than absolutely true. As I noted, Anselm needs the notion of "absolutely great-making" characteristics--being golden, as we have seen, is only relatively better (it depends upon the thing being discussed whether or not it would be "better" for it to be golden). The question is whether "exists in reality" is an absolutely great-making characteristic of things.
First, of course, one might maintain that it is not, that it is only relatively great-making. It is not better, one might argue that a debt exist in reality than that it exist in the understanding only (and similarly for any number of tragedies and hardships). Second, one might question whether "exists" (as it is used in the contrast here) is a property at all. This takes us to the thorniest critique of Anselm's argument. Immanuel Kant, who named this argument "The Ontological Argument," thinks there is a core difficulty because the argument wrongly assumes that `existence' is a predicate. This critique is very complex, but Ernest Nagel tellingly makes Kant's point as follows:
...to use Kant's example, when we think of $100 we are thinking of the nature of this sum of money; but the nature of $100 remains the same whether we have $100 in our pockets or not. Accordingly, we are confounding grammar with logic if we suppose that some characteristic is being attributed to the nature of $100 when we say that a hundred dollar bill exists in someone's pocket.(D) Finally, in regard to the conclusion:....When we say that a lion has a tawny color, we are predicating a certain attribute of the animal, and similarly when we say that the lion is fierce or is hungry. But when we say that the lion exists, all that we are saying is that something is (or has the nature of) a lion; we are not specifying an attribute which belongs to the nature of anything that is a lion.7
We must be certain to distinguish logical and ontological necessity. The former applies only to propositions or statements (a proposition is logically necessary if it is true in virtue of the meanings of the terms composing it). The latter notion is a uniquely philosophical one, and it is not immediately obvious that there must be any such "things." Indeed, one might contend, Anselm's whole proof tries to move from thought to reality in a way which confuses these "categories."
Notes:
1 Anselm begins his proof in "Chapter 2" by referring to Psalm 14:1 which says "The fool says in his heart, `There is no God.' They are corrupt, they do abominable deeds, there is none that does good"; and Psalm 53:1 which says the same thing. The translation here is that of the Revised Standard Version (N.Y.: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952). Back
2 Cf., O.K. Bouwsma, "Anselm's Argument," in his Without Proof or Evidence, eds. J.L. Craft and R.E. Hustuit (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1984), pp. 48-49. Back
3 An analytic statement is one which is supposed to be true in terms of the mere meaning of the terms involved. For example "squares are four-sided figures" is true because (a) `square' means `four [equal]-sided figure', and, thus, it reduces to an "identity statement." Such truths are conceptual truths. Back
4 A synthetic statement is one which is not true simply in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved. Here the truth of the statement depends on the way the world is, rather than, simply, on the way words are used. Back
5 Hans Reichenbach, "The Search for Certainty," in Certainty, ed. Jonathan Westphal (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), pp. 104-120, pp. 112-113. The selection originally appeared in Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1951). Back
6 William Rowe, "The Ontological Argument," in Reason and Responsibility (seventh edition), ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1989), pp. 8-17, p. 13. The essay originally appeared in the Third Edition of this work (1971). Back
7 Ernest Nagel, "The Case for Atheism," in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Labor of Reason, ed. Gary Percesepe (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1991), pp. 508-518, pp. 511-512. The selection originally appeared in Nagel's "Philosophical Concepts of Atheism," in Basic Beliefs, ed. J.E. Farichild (N.Y.: Sheridan House, 1959). Back
File revised on 07/21/2009.