Lecture Supplement of Alston’s The Reliability of Sense Perception Chapter 2
Copyright © 2009 Bruce W. Hauptli
Chapter 2. Track Record and Other Simple Empirical Arguments for Reliability
i. A Track Record Argument for the Reliability of Sense Perceptual Practice (SP):
12 If the goal is to establish the general reliability of SP, then an inductive argument from a suitable sample is the general way to proceed:
check a suitable sample of outputs for truth and take the proportion of truths in that sample as an estimate of the reliability of that mode of belief formation.
13-14 Problem: how do we determine whether the perceptual beliefs in our sample are true? Checking via perception is begging the question! “The basic point here is that nay way we have of determining perceivable facts in the physical world will depend, sooner or later, on what we learn from sense perception.” This, in a nutshell is the basis of a serious problem: the justification of induction!
14 “Let’s assume, then, that it is impossible to determine that a particular perceptual belief is true or false without making use at some point of what we take ourselves to have learned from SP. It follows that we cannot use an inductive track record argument for the reliability of SP without presupposing that reliability, and so falling into circularity.”
14 “Let’s use the term ‘basic’ for any doxastic practice of which this is true, that is, any practice for the reliability of which any otherwise effective track record argument would be circular. Such a practice is properly called ‘basic’, since its epistemic claims cannot be validated solely by the use of other practices.” According to Alston, such practices represent “…a way of forming beliefs that cannot be judged, at least in any simple fashion, on the basis of the output of other, more fundamental practices.”
Basic practices, then, function in a manner akin to basic beliefs! Here, then, we seem to be able to correctly characterize Alston as a foundationalist.
ii. Epistemic Circularity:
15 “…this kind of circularity involves a commitment to the conclusion as a presupposition of our supposing ourselves to be justified in holding the premises….”
16 “On my view, a belief is justified if and only if it is based on an adequate ground: that is, it is necessary only that the ground be adequate not that the subject know or justifiably believe this, much less that the subject know or justifiably believe that all the requirements for justification are satisfied.”
Here, we can infer, Alston is going to have to adhere to an externalism.
16-17 “SP must be reliable if I am going to be justified in holding perceptual beliefs, but I don’t have to be justified in supposing this to be the case. But then if SP is reliable, I can use various (justified) perceptual beliefs to show that SP is reliable, for I need not already be justified in holding the conclusion in order to be justified in holding the premises. The argument would still be epistemologically circular, for I am still assuming in practice the reliability of SP in forming normal perceptual beliefs. Nevertheless, I don’t have to be justified in making that assumption, in order to be justified in the perceptual beliefs that give me my premises. Hence the epistemic circularity does not prevent justification from being transmitted from the premises to a conclusion that would have been unjustified except for this argument.”
17 So far, however, we are not really better off: “we can say the same of any belief-forming practice whatever, no matter how disreputable. We can just as well say of crystal ball glazing that if it is reliable, we can use a track record argument to show that it is reliable.”
“Hence I shall disqualify epistemically circular arguments on the grounds that they do not serve to discriminate between reliable and unreliable doxastic practices.”
iii. A Piecemeal Approach:
17-18 Perhaps endeavoring to justify SP is too big a project—maybe we should use a “piecemeal” approach?”
18 Consider the “belief forming mechanism” where we take something that looks like a peach to be a peach:
We would have to rely on other processes to establish the reliability of this belief forming process: “we can smell, taste, and feel the object. We can determine whether it was picked from a peach tree. We could run biochemical and even microbiological tests. We can make ice cream or pie from it and see [oops?] what it tastes like….In none of these cases would we be relying on the move from It looks like a peach to It is a peach. To be sure, in these cases we are relying heavily on other perceptual mechanisms. Even in the sophisticated biochemical and microbiological tests, the tester has to rely on what she see [oops?], hears, or otherwise perceives at some point in carrying out the test.”
18-19 This sort of process would require a lot of work.
iv. Back to SP as A Whole:
19 “…it can hardly fail to strike us that we will fun into circularity if we persist long enough. To oversimplify, let’s say we check the accuracy of visual beliefs by using audition and touch in the perceptual part of those tests. Now what happens when we test the reliability of auditorily and tactiley formed beliefs? Perhaps we can get by with the other two senses (though I doubt it), but even if we could, when we come to test them we will perforce have to rely on one or more of the modalities already checked. So to put it schematically, vision is validated by audition and touch. Touch is validated by smell and taste. Smell and taste are validated by vision and audition. And here we have our circle
20-21 For coherence theorists, this sort of circularity is not a problem, but he is setting this view aside without a hearing. The core problem coherence theorists face is quickly summarized [21]: the possibility of a multiplicity of incompatible but equally coherent systems means that their account will not provide us with a positive account of epistemic status.
In addition to the problem Alston mentions here, coherence theorists are generally held to confront an input objection (which questions how the coherent system of beliefs will receive “input”—that is new beliefs—from the world). It is generally believed that our belief systems should be dynamic, and the coherence theorists seem to be unable to capture this element. Finally, it is generally held that the coherence theorists confront a problem of truth—that is, it is usually wondered why anyone (except for a coherence theorist about the nature of truth) would be tempted to hold that the coherence of a set of beliefs would be considered to be a sign for (or indication of) their truth.
21 This leaves us with our basic problem however, “is it possible to establish the reliability of sense perception in a noncircular fashion?
While the piecemeal approach has some attractiveness, SP seems to be a “natural unit.”
v. Pragmatic Arguments: Validation by Fruits:
23 “But how do we know we are often successful in prediction? By induction form particular cases of success, obviously. But how do we know that we are successful in particular cases? By using our senses to determine whether what was predicted actually occurred, or by having recourse to some other method that sooner or later relies on the deliverances of SP.” But, of course, this is circular!
23-25 Similarly, he contends, the appeal to evolution to “justify the reliability claim” is circular:
24 He sketches the argument and then cites several of Stephen Stich’s critiques: “first, he argues that evolution does not generally, much less always, produce optimally designed systems in surviving species. Second, he argues against the view that natural selection is the only important factor in the development of our basic doxastic tendencies.” Most importantly, however, he contends “The evolutionary theory that the argument presupposes and makes use of obviously rests on empirical evidence gathered by reliance on SP.” This means we are, again, confronted with circularity!
vi. The Road Ahead:
He will take a more lengthy look at both a priori and empirical arguments in the coming chapters. While it might seem to make sense to look at the most serious empirical arguments first, he follows the other course of action.
Why? Here we should take a look at the Table of Contents and understand the overall plan of the book.
File revised on 03/05/2009.