Social Hedonism/Utilitarianism

Note: "Egoistic Hedonism" is considered unsatisfactory as a moral theory because it explicitly rejects what many call the "Moral Point of View" - One has a moral duty to others (i.e. to treat others and oneself equally).

Being moral is NOT merely being prudent (as Egoism implies), but rather a willingness to (sometimes) sacrifice one’s own best interest for the welfare of another.

As a correction to Egoistic Hedonism of Epicurus, other Philosophers (e.g. Bentham) propose Social Hedonism or "Utilitarianism," the central tenant of which is the Principle of Utility.

Principle of Utility: An action is right if and only if it results in the greatest good for the greatest number (of people?).

Note: there is a minor difference between Social Hedonism and Utilitarianism. Specifically:

Utilitarianism: An action is right if and only if it results in the greatest GOOD for the greatest number (of people?). (Here "good" is not specified and may include other things besides pleasure. G. E. Moore was this sort of Utilitarian.)

Social Hedonism: An action is right if and only if it results in the greatest pleasure for the greatest number (of people?). (Here "good" is specified as pleasure. J. Bentham and J.S. Mill were this sort of Utilitarian.)

Morality requires that one value everyone’s welfare, not just one’s own.  Utilitarianism implies it may be morally necessary to sacrifice one’s own self interest for the good of others in some circumstances.

Social Hedonism/Utilitarianism suggests a cost benefits analysis where pleasure/pain is the "coin of the realm."

Utilitarianism is, in one way, the most idealistic of all ethical theories: it takes for granted that people will be motivated to work for the general good.

This was the ethical theory which inspired the reform movements in the newly industrialized countries of Europe during the nineteenth century. Utilitarian thinking helped bring about and justify the welfare state. (Karl Marx's political theory was a reaction to the same social injustices.)

Most famous advocates: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

Jeremy Bentham Version- Act-Utilitarianism

Since SO much depends upon correctly estimating the magnitude of the resulting pleasure, Benthm gives some pointers on what to consider.

 

Seven Aspects to a Pleasure:

1. Intensity:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates how acute, extreme or potent the pleasure is. The more intense, the greater its value all other things being equal.

2. Duration:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates how long the pleasure lasts. The longer it lasts, the greater its value all other things being equal.

3. Purity:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates whether or not the pleasure is mixed with any aggravation. The purer the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

4. Surety:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates the risk involved in the pleasure. The more certain one is of the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

5. Propinquity (Nearness):

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates whether the pleasure is close at hand or not. The more near at hand the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

6. Fecundity:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates whether or not the pleasure is likely to give rise to other, further pleasures in the future. The more fecund the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

7. Scope:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates how many others are effected by the action. The greater the scope of the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

Problems with Act-Utilitarianism (Practical and Theoretical)

Practical Problems:

Note: A Practical Problem is an objection to a theory which claims that whether or not the theory is true, the theory is problematic because can't be used.

1. Estimating Values: (Seems impossible to put numbers on things like family, health, reputation)

2. Predicting Consequences: (Cannot know the future consequences of our actions, nor predict them with the needed accuracy or rapidity and therefore cannot estimate resulting pleasures or pains.)

Theoretical Problems:

Note: A Theoretical Problem is an objection to a theory which claims that whether the theory can be used or not, the theory is problematic because it isn't true (complete, accurate, etc.).

1. "Is X (e.g. murder, lying, cheating, stealing) wrong?" Act-Utilitarianism can’t say anything more than, "Depends."

If slavery benefits more people than it harms it is moral.  This is not merely the position that "the ends justifies the means."  In that case, "means" matter, they are morally relevant, so much so that they stand in need of justification.  But according to Utilitarianism, "means" don't matter at all.  So, the morality of cheating, stealing, murdering, all "depend" on the consequences in any particular situation, according to this moral theory.  Further, if two courses of action result in the same amount of pleasure, but one requires theft, lying and murder while the other did not, neither course of action would be morally preferable according to Utilitarianism since it is only interested in "the bottom line."

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2. Diametrically opposed to "rights."

Rights seem best to be understood as a check on Utilitarian Advances. Notice that my "right to property" is another way of claiming that, no matter what noble ends you have in mind (helping the poor, feeding the hungry, educating children) you are morally prohibited from taking my stuff without my permission. Likewise with rights to life or liberty.

The theoretical objections above are meant to show that Utilitarianism is counter-intuitive.  Still, pointing out that a theory has weird results is not that same thing as proving it false.  Furthermore, it can be said on Utilitarianism’s behalf that it is the job a moral theories to correct mistaken intuitions.

The idea of utilitarianism it does capture how we try to reason morally at least sometimes.  Imagine that a physician gives a heart transplant to Annie instead of Bill and tells us he did so because Annie is a 30 year-old single mother of 3 and their sole means of support while Bill is a 55 year-old bachelor.  He reasons that more good/happiness/pleasure is likely to come from giving to the younger patient with dependent children. Even if we ultimately disagree with him, can see his point.  He is citing relevant moral reasons

By contrast if he had said, "Well of course I gave it to Annie because I always go alphabetically." that would strike us a weird and irrelevant.  So pleasure/consequences do seem to play SOME role in moral thinking.

But... does it play EVERY role?  Perhaps not.

Rule Utilitarianism:

John Stuart Mill attempts to refine Utilitarianism in a way that deals with the aforementioned problems:

Rule Utilitarianism: A moral theory which states that a moral rule is correct if and only if, following the moral rule, generally, results in the greatest good for the greatest number.  And an act is moral if and only if it accords with a correct moral rule.

According to this view, the right act for a person to do is the one which conforms to the (right) moral code of the community; the right code for the community to adopt is the one which, when adhered to by all, will best promote the general good.

Because of the practical limitations on pleasure assessment, personal bias, efficiency and time constrains of moral decision making and consequence predictions, etc., morality must be about general action-guiding directives (rules of thumb).

Therefore the moral question cannot (for practical reasons) be "What action in this particular case will produce the greatest pleasure?" but rather "Generally, what actions produce the greatest pleasure?"

Rule-utilitarianism was devised to cope with cases in which it appeared that applying the utilitarian standard directly to practical situations would lead us to contradict the traditional code of morality which enjoys strong intuitive support.

Further, Rule Utilitarianism provided Mill with a way of trying to justify rights, moral duties and a "Liberal Society."

Note: It's obvious enough that a theory which attempts to base morality on the general good must also answer the question about what the "good" is.

Mill argues against Paternalism in 'On Liberty"

Paternalism: Refers to those laws of other prohibitions imposed on persons which constitute a limit on an individual's personal freedom for his or her own good.

 

But note: The ONLY thing which justifies the rights of the individual according to Mill, is Utility. That is, generally speaking, it is an empirical fact that society or government micro-managing the private affairs of individuals is a less efficient means to general happiness than letting people pursue happiness privately unmolested by government. However, if this is the ONLY justification of rights, then in principle, should government develop more efficient methods or regulating the private lives of citizens, it would be justified in taking more intrusive action. Mill would have probably disapproved, even under these circumstances. However, it is unclear what philosophical objections his system would present.

"Mill’s Heresy"

Mill departed from Bentham's doctrine that all pleasures were of equal quality (Push Pin was as Good as Poetry) by saying that some kinds of pleasure are intrinsically better than others.

Unlike Bentham who was a "Quantitative Hedonist" Mill was a "Qualitative Hedonist."

Quantitative Hedonist: one who holds that the only value difference between two pleasures is amount. (Bentham)

Qualitative Hedonist: one who hold that two pleasures of equal quantity may differ with respect to value based on their respective qualities. (Mill)

Note: This is termed "Mill Heresy because to claim that two pleasures of equal quantity may nevertheless differ in value seems to presuppose a standard of evaluation (a "good-making quality) other then pleasure.  Thus it seems to contradict Hedonism.

How can we know which pleasures are superior to which? Experience says Mill, specifically, by consulting the feelings and preferences of people who have a wide experience of life.

According to Mill, our knowledge of moral values and moral obligations is based upon experience, the experience of ordinary people.  (This appeal to human desires and preferences, rather than to Reason or Nature or the Will of God earned utilitarianism the reputation of being a "godless" doctrine.)

"Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure."

Mill would urge us to acquiesce to the judgements of "pleasure-assessors" to decide on the moral desirability of various pleasures.  Ask those who are familiar with both which they prefer.

Mill claims that experience demonstrates that Mental Pleasures are judged more satisfying than mere Physical Pleasures by those well acquainted with both.  Thus we have empirical reason to believe that mental pleasures are of a superior quality (for humans at least) than physical pleasures.

Note: He is stacking the deck since the only persons qualified to judge on his terms are going to be those who have developed (distorted?) pleasure tastes.  This is why he is accused of being an elitist who sanctifies the preferences of upper-middle class middle-aged European white men.

Further, this smacks of Aristotelian Virtue.  The Happy Life (meaning "State") verses momentary satisfaction.  I am unconvinced Mill can defend this view on purely Hedonistic grounds.

One can devise examples which would have been embarrassing to Mill, e.g., "Which is better, gay sex or straight sex?" The jurors would have to be persons who had experienced both, and enjoyed both, if they were to be able to tell us which is morally preferable.