Mr. Clinton, take the lead in shaping up U.S. policy on Cuba

These comments and others on Meet the Press indicate that you understood the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 as an offer to the Cuban government to move gradually toward a transition that would reincorporate Cuba into our hemisphere. You speak of ``calibrated responses'' and ``sticks and carrots'' -- language that I drafted as an aide to then-Rep. Robert Torricelli, the originator of the legislation. In transition memos, as a senior adviser at the State Department, and as your special adviser at the White House, I sought to implement that legislation.

It is gratifying to learn that, in working so hard to prepare for a historic breakthrough in U.S.-Cuba relations, I and others were carrying out your wishes. However, it is frustrating as well, because your public commitment to these policy goals was something that we sought from you during that time but could never obtain.

Many of us understood that we were traveling a politically risky road. We tried to convince your advisers that your personal and public identification with these objectives would make them more achievable and would lessen the political backlash.

We drafted for you many versions of what we called ``The Cuba Speech,'' a high-level presidential outline of what your policies offered to Cuba and what Cuba's leaders could expect if they were willing to run the political risks for themselves of meeting us half way.

I mention my frustration not to revisit ancient political battles but because you must understand that you no longer have the political, legal, and constitutional authority to undertake what was a serious and reasonable policy.

When you signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms/Burton) in 1996, you took away much of your flexibility on, and established a rigid basis for, U.S. policy on Cuba. By signing a bill that codified into legislation the entire body of embargo regulation, you made Congress the arbiter of relations between the United States and Cuba. I do not believe that any president mindful of the burdens of his office should have accepted this intrusion on his constitutional authority.

Helms/Burton also defines a democratic transition in Cuba as requiring that Fidel Castro and his brother, Raul, are no longer part of the government. This provision in effect commits the United States to a violent, not a peaceful, transition in Cuba. It is a violent transition that poses the real threat to the United States from Cuba: uncontrolled migration or internal strife among Cubans that could involve U.S. citizens or forces.

These are the principal reasons why I argued unsuccessfully against your signing Helms/Burton. The alternative was to implement elements of Helms/Burton through executive authority, fight to defeat it, or veto the legislation if it passed. This was not an easy recommendation to make, and even more difficult to accept; it would have required your time and the marshaling of your considerable political skills for the battle. Perhaps it would have threatened your victory in Florida and New Jersey. But it was the right thing to do.

Instead, on the advice of your political staff, you signed legislation that makes you largely a passive observer of developments in Cuba. I do not believe that Castro is interested in leading Cuba toward a peaceful, democratic transition. But you now are prevented from the kinds of experiments and offers that were tried fitfully between 1993 and 1996 and that could demonstrate to the world and to key sectors in Cuba that Castro, not U.S. policy, is the obstacle to a brighter future for the Cuban people.

Rather than following the Pope's historic trip to Cuba with efforts to expand the personal and spiritual space produced by his visit, you are lamenting the current straitjacket in which U.S. policy is tied and asking Castro to provide you the justification for taking the initiative back from Congress.

Mr. President, if your recent remarks reflect a true concern for the dangerous situation in which we find ourselves vis-a-vis Cuba, ask someone to find some of those old drafts of ``the speech.'' Challenge Castro to conduct an experiment in free and fair elections on a municipal or provincial level. Announce that the United States is establishing a fund at the Organization of American States to provide technical assistance to Cuba for the elections. Create a general license for sales of medicines that are monitored by nongovernmental organizations in Cuba. Re-establish direct flights from the United States to Cuba for licensed activities such as family visits and scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges. Go to Miami and Union City, N.J., and tell the Cuban-American community that your goal is a free and democratic Cuba but that we must promote that transition in ways that are nonviolent and more likely to produce a democratic outcome.

This much and more you can do under current legislation. But if you make any progress, you soon will come up against the limitations of Helms/Burton. That is when you will have to decide if you want to lead -- or follow -- on Cuba. This memo is addressed to a leader.