"U.S. Policy toward Cuba Is Schizophrenic" / Business Week Online

October 27, 1999

Business Week Online, October 27, 1999

Richard Nuccio, Clinton's former special adviser, talks about dangerous contradictions in U.S.-Cuba "relations"

Support for the U.S. embargo of Cuba is eroding. In the latest sign of shifting attitudes, Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republican opponent of the embargo, arrived in Havana on Oct. 23 with a 45-member "bridge-building" delegation.

There are still dangers, though, of U.S.-Cuban confrontations that could trigger U.S. intervention or military action, warns Richard A. Nuccio, a visiting scholar at Harvard University who was President Clinton's special adviser for Cuba from 1995 to 1997. Such actions would severely strain U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America. To head off such a crisis, Nuccio advocates allowing selective U.S. investment in Cuba, under terms that would help to open its economy and society (for a Q&A with Cuba's top North American official, see BW Online, 10/27/99, "The Price That [the U.S.] Imposes on Cuba Is Unfeasible").

He argues that the President has the authority to permit such investments despite restrictions imposed by the 1993 Torricelli bill, which Nuccio helped write as an adviser to Senator Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.) and the 1996 Helms-Burton bill. Currently writing a book on U.S.-Cuba policy to be published by the Brookings Institution, Nuccio recently discussed his views with BW Online Contributing Editor John Pearson. Here are edited excerpts from their conversation:

Q: U.S. policy should recognize Cuba as an ongoing threat, you argue, even though you favor expanded ties with Cuba. Why?

A: The aim of U.S. foreign policy should be the national security of the U.S., but the definition of it has changed dramatically. Competition with the Soviet Union used to define it, but since the end of the Cold War, many other issues pose potential threats. In Latin America and the Caribbean, [the threats] are the kind that destabilize our relations and undermine the values we share with most countries in the region: protecting democracy and human rights, promoting free markets and free trade.

Cuba is the only [country] that fundamentally rejects these principles, which now form the core of the U.S. national interest in the hemisphere. Cuba created an immigration crisis with the U.S., cynically pushing thousands of people into the Florida Straits and shot down planes piloted by Cuban-American exiles.

Q: What is the potential for other dangerous flareups?

A: U.S. policy toward Cuba is schizophrenic. The official goal is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. But the Helms-Burton approach is what I call the pressure-cooker model for change: You screw down the lid and turn up the heat until the lid blows off. If there is a violent transition in Cuba, if the U.S. becomes involved in taking sides -- or even worse, if it intervenes militarily or acts in a tutelary role, as it has done in the past -- it will be a disaster for our relations with Latin America.

Q: How close were we to military retaliation after the exiles' planes were shot down in February, 1996?

A: Publicly, President Clinton announced responses such as restricting travel to Cuba and suspending direct air flights. But before that, he had considered a memo from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the options for attacking Cuban air force units and defense structures. U.S. pilots would have been at risk, and a lot of civilians would have been killed because these targets are in Havana. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had said we can do it quick and cheap, I think the President would have done it.

Q: How can we promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba?

A: Usually, we negotiate with the Cuban government only under the gun of a migration crisis or some other disaster. We need to negotiate proactively about things they want from us, such as cooperation on counter-narcotics and migration, provided we are able to talk about things we want from Cuba, which are human rights and economic reform.

Q: Can investment from abroad spur such a transition?

A: We should take advantage of changes in the Cuban economy with its creation of "enclave capitalism." The government allows private businesses in sectors such as tourism but wants to limit any linkages of these businesses to the rest of Cuba's economy and society. Instead of opposing investments in Cuba from other countries, we should be encouraging those that are already investing there to do so under certain principles, such as contracting directly with employees, permitting workers to organize to represent themselves, and making the goods and services they produce available to all Cubans.

Q: Realistically, will Castro accept such conditions?

A: Although the moment hasn't quite arrived, Cuba's economic difficulties will force it to reexamine its restrictive policies in order to get more serious, long-term investors. These are precisely the kind that are more likely to negotiate hard and be successful in obtaining a certain kind of conditions. So far, most investments in Cuba have been short-term boutique investments.

Q: Does Helms-Burton leave any role for U.S. investors in Cuba?

A: When President Clinton signed the law, his Administration issued a statement saying it does not restrict the right of the Executive Branch to make foreign policy. In its own view, the Administration has the legal authority to make any changes in the embargo that involve regulatory powers, and that is just about everything.

Q: What are likely targets for U.S. investment?

A: The Administration should use its current authority to allow investment in food, medicine, telecommunications, and other sectors where it would be likely to foment small-business activity. Telecommunications is already privileged under the Torricelli bill. And the future of telecommunications in Cuba will be more open and universal if American companies build the system. The U.S. government will have more success in pressuring U.S. companies to provide universal phone and Internet access than in pressuring Italian or Mexican or French companies.

Q: President Clinton has been relaxing the embargo in small steps such as easier money transfers. What do these accomplish?

A: Some of them reinforce Cuban private-sector activities and civil society. On another level, these measures mobilize other constituencies in the U.S. -- businesses, religious organizations, humanitarian organizations -- that have stakes in Cuban relations. This gives the Administration a more diverse political playing field, allowing it to maneuver among opposing forces.

Thirdly, these measures provide the President with a cushion of options if we have another confrontation -- and I think it's a matter of when, not if. In 1996, there weren't many diplomatic options left to punish Cuba. Now he can say, no more exchanges, no more baseball games, no more travel. If we have a really tight, rigid relationship, the chances of moving to a military confrontation are higher.

Q: Helms-Burton makes Castro's removal the condition for any basic change in relations with Cuba. What does that signify?

A: Castro probably isn't going to change. But U.S. policy should not be based by law on the assumption that he can't change. What that says to Cubans is that we assume that Cuba's transition has to be a violent one. That isn't the message we ought to send. Chances are that the next President of Cuba, the next Minister of Defense and Treasury Secretary are already among the people around Castro. We should be constantly trying to reach those people and send the message all the time that the U.S. is not the obstacle to a peaceful transition.

EDITED BY DOUGLAS HARBRECHT

10/27/99 12:11 AM

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