History teaches that the collapse of communism in any one country does not have predictable consequences. It can be bloody, as in Romania, or peaceful, as in Czechoslovakia. It can lead quickly to a successful open economy, as in Poland, or to corruption, massive theft of public property and risible governance, as in Russia.

So the Castro regime in Cuba might end badly and bloodily, perhaps even with open conflict involving Miami exiles returning to claim their stolen property. Or it could produce a soft landing, perhaps easing the island quickly into prosperity and democracy.

What is predictable is that the policy of the United States will have consequences for the outcome and will probably even affect its timing.

Thus the suggestion recently sent to the President by 15 moderate senators that he appoint a national bipartisan commission on Cuba. The initiative originated with Sen. John Warner, R-Va.; he persuaded 14 of his colleagues, including John Chafee, R-R.I., Craig Thomas, R-Wyo., Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., and Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., to join his appeal.

The model is the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America -- popularly known as the Kissinger Commission -- appointed by President Reagan 14 years ago. The Kissinger effort on Central America extended over a six-month period.

The committee included a Supreme Court justice, academics, trade unionists, distinguished Democrats such as Robert Strauss and notable Republicans such as the future Treasury secretary, Nicholas Brady.

It sifted through a mountain of testimony about the murderous civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, traveled the region to hear the views of citizens and came to a measured assessment of the effectiveness of then-U.S. policy in bringing closure to those bloody conflicts.

Something similar, it is supposed, would help to take a fresh look at our Cuba policy.

The U.S. policy of isolating Cuba was locked in place in the few months after Fidel Castro's bloody ending of the Fulgencio Batista regime in December 1959, his nationalization of U.S. investments and his suppression of political opposition soon thereafter. Not much has changed in Cuba since then.

Four decades on, Castro remains the ultimate arbiter, intolerant of dissent and with an iron control of the economy.

But if neither U.S. nor Cuban policy has changed, the world has. Communism has collapsed in Europe. Soviet global ambitions have also collapsed -- as have the massive Soviet subsidies that kept the Cuban economy afloat.

The economies of the world have merged and taken off. The call everywhere is for free markets, trade expansion and the migration of capital wherever opportunity beckons -- all nightmarish to true communists.

Latin America has undergone a revolution -- and not, as Castro had hoped, a Marxist one. Now, with the single exception of Cuba, every country in the hemisphere boasts a representative government.

It is therefore no surprise that thoughtful people think it may be time to take another look.

The issue for a bipartisan Cuban commission is not whether U.S. policy toward Cuba for the past four decades has succeeded or failed. The commission's purpose is not to judge the past but to assess the future.

The Cuba debate is not a contest over who despises tyranny more. It is about what policy will best serve the United States' national interest in the future.

The commission should recommend what this country ought to do to hasten the end of the authoritarian communism in Cuba, alleviate the hunger and misery of the Cuban people, assist that nation on the long road to freedom and prosperity -- both now, and most crucially, when the Castro era finally comes to its dismal end.