Now, just when you and I and everyone else thought that they had heard every argument for and against the U. S. economic embargo of Cuba, comes J. Kenneth Lipner, an economist at Florida International University, to add a new twist. He does it by focusing on the flip side of the issue: the consequences of sanctions for us.

Economists have looked at how much of a bite the embargo takes out of the Cuban economy, and they have speculated about what part of the cost is borne by the average Cuban. A reasonable answer: much less than the Cuban government claims, much more than the U. S. and exile supporters of the embargo are willing to concede.

Lipner, however, is interested in a different angle, and that is what makes his contribution novel. How much of a toll, he asks, does the embargo extract on the United States and, more specifically, on South Florida? It's an issue that has not been addressed, and one that could have major implications for meeting Miami's toughest challenge -- jobs.

Lipner tackles it in a provocative paper -- ``The Estimated Economic Costs of the Cuban Embargo on the South Florida Economy'' -- delivered at a Cuban studies conference held at FIU last month.

So what does the embargo cost Miami? Plenty, according to Lipner's calculations and his assumptions concerning the area's economy and the role of trade. More precisely, it is estimated that South Florida forgoes nearly $1 billion in income annually because of the ban on trade with Cuba.

This translates into 30,000 jobs that would exist but don't, jobs that would make a big dent on the area's persistently high rate of unemployment. Some of these jobs would go to white-collar workers, but many would not.

Among Lipner's projections: ``Cuba trade could very well stimulate a mini-building boom, creating a demand for warehouses and more first-class office space downtown.'' The FIU economist concludes that ``the opportunity costs of forsaking Cuba trade. . .is a very high price for all of us to pay. . .a luxury that the poorest among us cannot afford.''

The findings are certain to be challenged by peers and politicos, but Lipner assures me that he is confident about his methodology and results. He is aware, for example, of the sorry state of the Cuban economy these days, and makes allowances for it.

Don't look for Miami business leaders to advocate an end to the embargo as part of a strategy for economic development in the next decade, however. When it comes to Cuba, passion preempts profit as well as good sense, and the group with the most passion has a virtual veto on policy. A 1997 FIU survey of 1,200 Cuban-Americans in Miami found that only about 7 percent believe the embargo is working very well. But, fully 78 percent want it to continue!

The evidence suggests that the Pope's anti-embargo message during his 1998 visit to Cuba at most shaved only a few points off that support. Not swayed by the moral authority of the Pontiff, hard-core embargo supporters are unlikely to be persuaded by an economic argument. Their views, inscribed into U. S. law since passage of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, will continue to determine policy for the foreseeable future. But, some day the rest of the community and the nation will have to ask whether a policy with such dubious humanitarian, political and economic implications shall endure.
e-mail:maxcastro@miami.edu