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Daniel
Osvaldo Murgo
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| Current Research: |
Viability of Conditional Assistance Programs with Endogenous Lobby Formation |
| Abstract:
Conditional assistance programs generate conflicting relationships
between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member
countries. The political dynamic of the country adds to the conflict
and usually results from opposing interests between the government and
special interests groups opposed to reforms. The experience of IFIs
with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more
latitude in the design of their reform programs. Conditionality and
ownership are not always relevant. A reformist government does not need
conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. The
usefulness becomes apparent in intermediate situations. A government
that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform
lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in
implementing reforms. PDF File |
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| Welfare Effects of Taxes in a Small Open Economy | |
| Abstract:
Analyses of welfare effects of taxation policies typically start with a
pristine setting without distortions and quantify the losses from tax
increases. In reality, numerous taxes in existence distort the economy
and changes in one tax instrument that would be welfare improving in
their absence may lead to paradoxical losses. This paper provides
quantitative examples of such paradoxes for a small open economy
populated by infinitely-lived agents. PDF File |
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| The Political Economy of Failed States | |
| Abstract: Failed States are the subject of numerous studies but few, if any, take into account the economic dimension of the phenomenon. The only reference in the economic literature is the study of hyperinflation, which is a limited form of state failure. It is necessary at this stage to develop a more encompassing analytical framework to determine the nature of the relationship between weak or non-existent political institutions and the economic consequences that they generate. The purpose of this paper is to design and test a theoretical and empirical framework to analyze the economic causes and consequences of Failed States. It also analyzes the economic institutions and policies that should be implemented in a process of nation building. In the analytical part we stress the importantce of the link between economic institutions, economic policies, and economic outcomes. The empirical strategy relies on 2SLS. Institutions and economic outcomes are both endogenous variables in the model. Using OLS may generate problems of reverse causality or the effects of omitted variables. Also institutions and policy variables are measured with error or the available data represents the variables poorly. All this considerations support an empirical strategy based on 2SLS with distinct and plausible instruments for both institutions and policies. | |
